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PKEFACE
The present worK Is neither a study of the monetary situation
m the four south American Republics - Oriental lirtlguay, Brazil^
Chile, and Argentine - considered as a statical problem, nor Is
It aa historical Investigation In the strict sense of the word.
The writer rather^Trled to show the evolution of Ideas and the
fete gradual growth of the forces which cooperated to m&Ke the
monetary situation In each country what It Is to-day. With this
purpose In view the writer endeavoured td bring together such
facts of the political life of each country, Its trade balances
budgetary history, rise and fall of the national debt, and Its
agricultural and coEnaerclal activities, as would enable one to
understand the changes In the donihln of currency circulation
not as arbitrary measures of governments lacXlng the el&mniiS
Knowledge of the elements of financial science, but as phenome-
na having their causes in the economic and political life of the
country^ and theoretical views, sometimes - prejudices, of the
t Ime
.
In carrying out this program the writer was limited by two
things: the scope of the worK, and the amount of material avail-
able. Without maKlng the worK many times larger than It is now,
it was impossible to treat many problems as extensively as might
have been desired. Thus, only passing mentloiri could be made of
the balances of trade, and no attempt at all to construct for
ajiy of the countries a general balance. I.e. a balance includ-
ing not only the movements of exports amd Im.ports of merchandlBtf,
but also movement of money in the form of capitals Invested in
the country, brought by immigrants , exported by travellers and

for the payment of foreign debts etc. The same consideration
forced the writer to choose some starting* point In the Investig-
ation of hie subject In each country as near the present time
as was compatible with his purpose. It was, however, considered
desirable to have these starting points chosen according to some
fundamental rule rather than arbitrarily, and after some consi-
deration the following was thought to answer the purpose. It wa5
noticed that the history of the south American Republics may be
broadly divided In the case of each country into two periods:
I) factional fight for power; 2) more or less regular develop-
ment under a more or less stable government . The present worK
deals only with the second period, the first having at present
a purely historical interest. For each country some great histo-
rical landmark was found, and the narrative led from it follow-
ing, as far as convenient, the chronological order of events.
The problem of material available was the most serious one.
The whole worX is written on the basis of the materials in the
library of the university of Illinois (mainly brought in I9I0
from south America by Professor David Kinley) and in Professor
Kinley's private library (materials from the last having been
very Kindly lent to the writer by their owner). This represents
probably the richest and best assorted source of economic and
financial information on the sub:)ect in the United states, but
nevertheless it often happened that the writer had to adjust
his plan of v,'orK to the material available simply because the
authors of the books which he consulted did not pay any attention
to the sides of the problem which interested him, and there was
no direct information available. Thus, e.g. the writer was abso-
lutely unable to find any information whatever on the question

how much actual capital was at lork in the foreiga banks in the South
Meriean countries; how ;nuch capital was imported by the i:amigrants;
did the iinmii^rants send any appreciable aoiounts of money to their na-
tive countries; how did the changes in the rate of exchan.^e affect
land values and the developsaent of ai^ri culture^ etc. All these Questions
to be lefb without consideration owin^ to lack of sufficient and Beliab
Material.
As regards the bibligbaohy, the writer has laentioi^ed only materials
actually uf*d in the course of this .work. Mo mention has been made of aa
ri^lA o^, a gener al. char acte<r, historical or political, because such in-
formation forras the background rather than the body of ..he work. .As re-
gards the articles in various European periodicals,^ the writer has ^one
over the files,
>
for the last fifteen years, of fhe most imporr:ant of
them in German, French, Italian, and Dutch (the English were omitted as
bein?! included in the biblio^sraphical reviews of the Internatinal BureaK
of the American Republics), only to find how little attention was paid
to this subject by the European economic writers. Ae a matter of fact,
nearly the only arricles actually used were the excellent reviews of
the coffee trade in the Dutch "De economist «. Of the books ouoted, espe-
cially extensive use was aiade of the works of Prof . Acevedo for the
chaoter on Uruguay, and of the very recent and exhaustive study
!iad
e#

Of Mr. Calogeras for that on Brazil.
There is one more subjeet which It will he well to mention
here
.
It Is impossible to speaK of the history of the currency in
the South American Republics without mantionlng cases of abuses^
violation of public contracts etc. It would be, however, wrong
to infer from this that the methods of South American finance
were particularly dishonest. Thejr were simply what the methods
Of finance of nearly all countries were at one or another peri-
od Of their history, neither better, nor worse. Even such count-
ries fwiriete^; are at present considered to be the very Ideals of
Keeping to the eplrlt of the contracts In their dealings with
the public, were not always so. A. de Tocquevllle says of France
Of the eighteenth century (Old Regime and the Revolution, ch.X)
"the history teems with Instances of royal properties sold,
then resumed as Inanallenable ; of violated contracts; vested
rights trampled; public creditors sacrificed at every crisis;
the public faith constantly broKen". And Macaulay (History of
England, vol.1. BK.I, Ch.III) Informs us that "from a period of
Immemorial antiquity it had been the practice of every English
government to contract debts. "JOiat the revolution introduced
was the practice or honestly paying them", le see thus that even
the strongest - financially - countries passed through periods
Of financial wicKedness in the formative stages of their economic
A
history. They had, however, the advantage that when King Charles
refused to pay his debts in London, Lewis the Fourteenth did
the same thing In Paris, and so no comparisons injurious to the
reputation of these monarchs could be drawn at that time. The

south American Republics were passing their formative stage
when the principle of p&ylng public debts^becSme firmly estab-
lished on the world's raarKet, and their failure to conform to
It, however In accordance with general laws of history It may
have been, could not help causing a good deal of unfavourable
comment. We shall see, however that the leading South American
Republics have already passed this formative stage, or are near
pbsslnt; It, and that on the average the administration of their
budgets is now on as good a basis as in most of the growing
States of good financial standing.

UKU&UAY
.
"i^utiny in the army, a revolutionary movement which termi-
nated in a deeply sutoversive adjustment; a deflcll? which piti-
lessly grew from month to month; a military administration
wnich toftf^ a lion's share in the distribution of the public
funds; such were the factors which made their appearance at the
very beginning of the organisation of our institutions, hamper-
ing the political and economic development of a country admi-
rably endowed by nature, but cruelly persecuted by its own sons
during the long prriod which we propose lo review".
I could not thinK of a better lntr(l)duct ion to the discussion
Of the monetary situation In Oriental Uruguay than this summary
Of the period of the Constituent Assembly in Prof. Acevedo's
book ( vol.1, p.l6).
The history of Oriental Uruguay wc^aW^ ^ lo^S list of
revolutions, mutinies and diet atx3roAt/>5 with their usual result -
fall of the credit of the country. In the case of Uruguay, ac-
cording to the memorandum of the Council of Public Credit pre-
sented to the Qovernment in 1853 » the credit of the country was
In such a state that some of its obligations were discounted
at an Incredible reduction of 99ifo, l-c- sold at one cent for
two dollars nominal. One might expect, under these conditions,
to have to record many fluctuations in the value of money, such
as one is accustomed to find in the darker periods of European
financial history. As it happens, the history of the monetary ^
•Ituation In Uruguay has some peculiarities seldom met with
elsewhere
.

When the Kopubllc was formed, the monetary situation In the
country was in a perfect chaos. There was no national coin as
yet, and therefore foreign coins had to toe used, but while sil-
ver oHd gold coins were practically of full value, the copper
coins were far ielow thrir nominal values; this naturally made
traders abroad anxious to import copper coins into the country,
and people in the country inclined to effect their payrnents,
particularly to the Government, in the cheap copper coins. The
first monetary laws of Uruguay aim^o combat this evil. The law
Of March 1829 prohibit^/ the importation of foreign copper coins
into the country. A decree of February 6 of the same year pro-
vides that not more than one quarter of the total amount paid
t
should be paid in copper to tax-offices in Monevldeo. The law
of July II of the same year cstabllshce a gradual scale of re-
duction Of the proportion of copper money to be accepted by the
public offices, viz.: from half copper, and half gold and sil-
ver, in the first quarter of the year following the publication
of the law, to only 2^ after a year's time, the Government pro-
mising to pay in the same way. During the discussion of these
laws ana^'^ome projects which were withdrawn later on, it was
stated by the Government that the "promesas" (promissory bank-
notes) of the Bank of Buenos Aires were the only legal circula-
ting form of money in the country, and that according to the
laws then in force no other form of money could be adopted. The
Government ( the Cabinet of Don Lucas Obes ) tried to obtain the
consent of the constituent Assembly for an issue of 150.OOO pe-
sos in banknotes, to be covered by the fund of copper money,
but this pro.1ect had to be withdrawn because from the day of

its announcement It became clear that the commercial world was
not willinc; to accppt these hanKnotes at their face value; the
only course tnat remainedjopen was to reduce the proportion of \
copper acceptable In payments to and from the G-overnment , as
was done In the law of July II, IS29. Dr. Florenclo Varela who
has made a special study of the economic conditions of this pe-
riod, states that Brazilian copper coins, both good and counter-
feit, came to Montevideo in large quantities, and that large
quantities of such coins were imported as contraband even into
Brazil Itself from the Spanish posseeaions, notwithstanding
all the efforts of the Brazilian Government to Keep them out.
i« Tllfle circumstances forced the Uruguaian oovernment to adopt u
183 I several new laws regulating the copper currency of the
country. The law of January 26, I831, deprived foreign coins
(copper) of being a legal tender of payment, and authorised the
executive power to organize a company of capitalists for the
purpose of withdrawing from circulation the Buenos- Aires and
Brazilian money. The capital of the company was to be 150.OOO
pesos, and it, and the interest on it, were to be paid out of
a special duty on importation.
In the message of June 9, 183 1, the rrovernmtfttinformed the
Permanent Comiaisslon on Monetary Affairs that, according to the
Information collected by the Company of Shareholders, there Wa5
a scarcity of small coins both in the capital and in the coun-
try, and that it would be possible to recoin and issue 150.000
pesos in small coins of two and four vlntenes each, on the fol-
lowing basis: a peso being equal to eight reals, a real to 8
octavos, each coin of four vlntenes was to represent two octa-
vos or a quarter of a silver real. The Permanent Coraiaisslon

Justly ,considered that the project of the Government might open
the door to rioodlng the country with bad money, and allowed
the Issue of only twenty thousand/ pesos as a sum amply sufficleni
for the requirements of the circulation. The same desire to
liurf, as far as possible, the country of bad or unreliable
money prompted the passage of the law of December 31,1833, by
which the importation of banlcnotes from Buenos -Aires Into
Uruguay was absolutely prohibited.
We see thus that the main problem of the Urugualan aatlon
up to tne early tnlrtles, as far as monetary problems were con-
cerned, was to get rid of the copper currency, "the gnawing
cancer which was by degrees eating up our effective wealth",
according to the expression of the presidential message of Feb-
ruary 20, 1832 .
.
For thirty years after the successful driving out of the
worthless foreign copper coins, Uruguay practically had no mo-
ney Of its own. The law of June 23 > I862 , was destined to re-
jQQdy « at least theoretically - this evil. It established as
the national monetary units: the silver peso divided into 100
centesimos, and the gold doblon equal in value to ten silver
pesos. It was decided to issue at tne first opportunity the ne-
cessary quantity of various coins, but^untll the time when such
an opportunity would present itself, the law provided for a cir
culatlon of foreign gold and silver coins by legally fixing a
a table of their values. The fact that Uruguay was unable to
Issue coins according to the above quoted law was after all of
some advantage to the country as a whole by saving it from
possible losses at tne time of the demonetisation of silver.

The law fixed the gold and silver ratio at 1^-^, and made both
metals equally good for payments. There is hardly any doubt that
the little gold which Uruguay might at best be acic to put on 1
Its marKet would b« very speedily drawn away at the first sign
|
Of the fall of prices or silver, and the country would thereby /^ai/
•
needlessly los^ a few hundred thousand pesos. Happily, he who
does not have cannot lose, and that was the situation of Uruguaj^
at that time.
The same law granted to the banKs permission to issue bank-
notes of a value not below a doblon, without prejudice to their
rights of issuing banknotes of minor denominations granted to
them by their respective charters. Next in importance to this
law comes the law of March 23 > I665, which allowed the creation
Of banks for deposit;^ and discount business, and for the
Issue of banknotes. As regards the last function of the banks.
It was provided that all the banknotes Issued by the banks be
payable at sight to bearer in gold coin; that the normal mini-
mum value or the banj^iotcs snould not be below ten pesos, but
that the banks should have a right of issuing temporarily bank-
notes Of lower denominations, payable In gold and to an amount
not exceeding 20^ of their effective circulation; the failure
to pay a single banknote was to lead to the closure and liqui-
dation Of the bank, in which case the banknotes were to be paid
first, in preference to all other creditors of the Institution;
the amount of banknotes Issued could in no case exceed three
times that of the effective capital.
This law Is ©specially interesting in that It provides that
the banknotes should be paid in gold exclusively, although offi-

cially, according to the law of I862 , the country was bimetal-
llstlc. This system was later even officially rejected toy the
law of June 7, IS? 6, which states that gold is the only foimdat-
tlon Of the monetary system, and that silver Is legal tender
only for sums not exceeding hi pesos In a total payment of a
doblon, ten pesos In a payment not exceeding 1000 pesos, and 20
pesos In a payment exceeding one thousand pesos. We shall dis-
cuss the other features of the law of IS65 when we come to
speaK atoout the banKlng system of the country. The above propor-
tions of payraents for which silver was legal tender were slight-
ly changed by the law of October 18, 1892, which authorized the
Government to coin 3. 000. 000 pesos in silver, and prohibited the
circulation of foreign silver coins. Finally thi? law of Decem-
ber 6, 1900, demonetized the copper, provided for the coinage of
500.000 pesos in nickel, and limited the use of it as a legal
tender to one quarter of a peso.
Such is the situation as far as the purely monetary legis-
lation can show it. When we turn to facts, we find that although
Uruguay has a monometallic gold currency, the doblon never was
coined, and most llKely never will be unless for decorative
purposes. The favourable balances of trade attract to the count-
ry considerable amounts of foreign money, and the circulation
is always well supplied with gold coins, especially with Bri-
tish sovereigns, the best gold coins of the world. This fact
not only saves the country from the expense of coinage, but pro
vides for its coramerce means of payment abroad in coins accept-
ed everywhere at par, while the doblon of Uruguay would in the
best case be accepted only at a discount for recoinage or re-ex
portation to Uruguay.

We pass no^ w to the consideration of the developmenlr of banK-
Ing in Uruguay which v/dll mo inly deal with the history of banK-
note Issues in that country. We mentioned before the law of
I865 which Is the basis of the whole legislation regulating
the banKlng business in the country. It provided that banKs
may issue notes to an amount not exceeding three times their
effective capital. As a matter of fact, there were already at
that time banKs which had a right to issue notes granted to
then by the terms of their concessions, such were, e.g., the
famous banic of Baron de Maua which was incorporated in 1857
by/i a special Act of Parliament with a capital of 1.200.000
pesos and a right of issuing banKnotes up to three times Its
capital. It was probably the success and high financial stand-
ing of these institutions Which led the Urugnmlan Crovernment
In I865 to adopt for private institutions this excessive ratio
of b^-nXnotes to capital (three to one), a ratio which even the
ncctcon^
strongest - flnfinclally do not dare to adopt for their State
banKs. This ratio was especially dangerous because it provided
that up to 20^ of the issue coula be made in banKnotes of small
dend>minatlons. As might have been expected, the banKnotes, in
accordance with Gresham's Law, would first drive the good money
out Of circulation, and then at the first financial disturbance
come m a rush to the banKs to get exchanged for m.etalllc money
which could not be in the banKs since the banKnotes were three
times their effective capital. The comiQerce of the country at
that time was not extensive enough to Keep a large amount of mo-
ney In circulation, so that the Urugualan banKnotes did not have
even the protection, that the U.S. greenbacK or BanK of England

note can rely so mich upon, under tnese circumstances even one
to one would probably prove to toe dangerous, wh^lc with three
mere(y
to one there was not danger, tout certaity of failure. The crl-
sis of 1868 made toanKrupt nearly all the toanKs In the country,
and their toanKnotes - practically worthless Paper.
It may toe interesting to Know how the Urugualan men of tousl-
ness considered the situation. In April 1868 Baron de Maua pub-
lished a memorandum in which he tried to show that his toank had
on its toooKs the mador part of the credit transactions result-
ing from the financial and economic activities of the country,
and that at this dangerous period the Government ought to have
come to lis help in order to save the country; that the toank
suffered from a run on it due to the effects of the English
crisis of 1866 ( Overend and Gurney), a run which it could easi-
ly^sto^^if the Government had paid to the toanK its detot or I.OOC/.
000 pesos, or, if it had no money to pay, if it had made the
Maua toanKnotes legal tender; tnat the general conditions were
such that legitimate tousiness was disorganised, there were too
many toanKs, and excessive importations of products of consumpt-
ion haW led to a rapid diminution (biT the gold reserves of the
country. Maua recommendfl55/t}ic*efore that no toanK toe allowed to
issue toanKnotes to an aiaount larger than its realised capital,
or larger than twice its met&lllc reserves, and that it toe ex-
pressly prohibited to count in the actual "cash on hand" for
monetary purposes banKnotes of other toanKs. "The major part of
the toanKs do not possess gold to any serious extent at all, toe-
cause that requires a sacrifice. All that they have in their
treasuries notes of other toanKs, - one of the great defects
of the present banKing system" (lb.).

We see thus that the cri&ls of 1868 had two results: a large
amount of Inconvertible nanKnotes of the private banks, and a
conviction that the existing' banKing system was unsound. The Go-
vernment which, as we have seen, was more at fault In this case
than anybody else, limited Its activities to ap pointing a com-
mission which immediately divided itself into two parties with
diametrically opposite views One party (Mssrs. TomKlnson, Diehl
and Folic) maintained that "as long as the country is not firm-
ly persuaded that there can be no greater evil for its trade
than an inconvertible circulation, it will be Inconvenient to
allow any issue of banknotes". They based this sweeping view
on tx^ e following considerations: the utility of banknotes con-
sists neerly exclusively in a greater facility of transmission,
and this slight advantage does not compensate for the risks of
hf^ving an inconvertible currency; that, as the experience of
the preceding years nai^ shown, in several cases where tkey were
given cours force' , it wronged private interests and tended to fa
vour the Insolvent banks, while solid banking establishments
only suffered by it, and Indeed could not live at all; that if
issue of banknotes, sub.-5ect to become inconvertible at each
moment, be suffered to continue, foreigr capital will no long-
er flow to the country to support its industries.
The other view (Mssrs. Bamirez , Fernandez, and Busto) was
Inspired by the principle of freedom for banking. According to
the opinion of the lest named gentlemen, the banknotes were
sufficiently guaranteed by the prefered position which they had
with regard to all the other creditors of the bank; the offi-
cial control will only tend to weaken the more real and effi-
cient control Of the public; what is only necessary is: to in-

crease the responsibility or the bankers, simplify and shorten
the process of liquidation of Insolvent Institutions, and create
punishments which would Keep hanKers from comraltlLlnt; frauds.
We see thus that while one part or the Commission rccoiQiQciDe^-
ed what the Germans call das Kind mlt dem Bade ausschuetten , the
other part came to the conclusion that the hanXln^; as it>*|s oAjs
about all right, if only the banKers coftfie'oe Kept in the narrow
path Of virtue. The measures proposed by the Corpjnlssion were
far better, however, than could be espected under such circum-
stances. The commission reco; mended that no bsnK be allowed to
open its doors until the whole capital has been realised in
gold(.durlng the crisis It was found out that several banKs be-
gan their activities with only part or their capital actually
paid in, and that, when the crisis began, the shareholders es-
caped their obligations of paying in the rest or the capital
by transferlng their shares to men who had no property worth
BpeaKlng of). The next provision is rather peculiar: no banK
should be allowed to loan any m<l>ney to the Government without
specirjl permission from the legislative Assembly, and even then
to an amount not in excess of one quarter of its capital, while
the Government should be dietinctly prohibited from farming to
a banKlnf establishment the collection or distribution of taxes
or rents from public lands. The explanation given by the Com-
mission Is worth quoting: "According to the coramon opinion of the
economists, there is nothing more dangerous than an over-close
connection ( vlnculaclon ) between the banKs and the Government.
This is especially applicable to this country which has not yet
succedcd In establishing its stability on a firm basis, and in

which the respect for the laws and the adherence to principles
do not constitute an Invincible protection against abuses and
errors on the part of the State".
Besides these fundamental propositions, the Conmlsslon worK-
ed out several minor regulations for banK booK-Keeplng, publi-
cation Of balances, banK receiverships etc. We do not mention
them In detail because none of them was accepted. As a matter
Of fact, while the Conialsslon was discussing the situation, the
scare of the crisis wore a little off, and the Ministry found
out that too tight a lid on the abuses of the banKs might prov^
In the language of modern statesmanship, "not to be in accord-
ance with the higher purposes of the government", consequently,
the Minister of Finance presented in I869 to the Legislative
Assembly another pro,lect in which the fundamental principles
of the law of I865 were preserved with the following additions
and alterations In the main details: the banks were allowed to
Issue notes of only 20, 50, and ICO pesos, payable in gold; the
(xovernment was prohibited from forcing loans from thr banKs, or
granting them concessions which were cont?rary to the laws, or
tended to pervert the nature of an Institution of credit; the
Issue Of banknotes ( payable in gold on demand ) from ten cente-
slmos to five pesos was to be a monopoly of the State; the cont-
rol of the State to be limited to ascertaining that the bank ha^
realised its capital, and to liquidating It after the bank has
failed to pay its notes.
This project, with some modifications, passed the Chamber
of Deputies, but was rejected by the Senate which found that
n
some Of its provisions were uncqst Itutlona:; while others were

nothing tout a repetition of similar provisions in the law of
IS65. This left tne ground practically free to new abuses, but
the end of the sixties^ and the beginning of the seventies was
commercially a very good time, and the population did not feel
them 0/©^ much. It was, however, understood that something must
be done with the banks, and In July 1873 ^ Wl^Jper of the Cham-
ber Of Deputies, Dr. Jose Fedro Ramirez, presented a project of
a new banking lav/ which contained the following main features: I
the incorporation of a bank could be effected only by an ac^
of the legislature which was free to grant the concession or
refuse to do so; a banking corporation must realise all its ca-
pital in gold before it can begin business; the management of
the banks should be absolutely free from all control and inter-
ference of the government ;* the banks were to be obliged to
"clear" each other's notes weekly, paying the difference in
gold; the failure to pay a single note leads to bankruptcy; a
special court of comjnerce to be established etc.
However radical this project appears to be, the Chamber of
Deputies went far beyond it, and voted a law by which each inha-
bltant or the Republic was to be allowed to issue "so called
banknotes" ( billetes llamados de banco) written by hand, print-
ed, or lithographed In any quantity, so long as th^y were con-
ihcj^cl receive
vertlble Into gold, but that the public offices payments in me-
tallic money exclusively. The Senate substituted for it another
project which simply abrogated the former limitations of the
banks concerning the issue of banknotes of a nominal value
under one doblon. As the financial committee stated in its re-
port, there was no substantial difference between the two pro-
jects, since, according to the opinion of the Senate, the ex-

Isting laws already allowed what the new law proposed to grant.
The project of the Senate was strongly supported by the banx*-
ers of Montevideo who wanted to obtain a right to Issue small
banKnotes, but had no sympathy for a law which would allow eve-
rybody to do so. They insisted on the danger of such a course
for the country's coioinerce, and pointed out that although a
banknote is not money in its full sense, still it does money's
worK, drives real money out of circulation, and for all these
reasons requires some reglamentat ion on the part of the Govern-
ment .
The internal friction of the legislative m?.chinery proved, ho<v4
1
ever, to be too great in this case, and finally all these pro-
jects had to be dropped, and the fundamental law of I865 , which
was already amply proved to be perfectly inadequate, remained
in full force.
The way to abuses was thus left open, but remained for some
time unused. The memory oi" the recent crisis was as yet too
fresh in the minds of the people to allow the bankers to try
something new. Besides, no "deal" on a largee scale could be car-
ried out without the hearty support of the Government, and no
government was strong enough to be counted upon for any length
Of time. Notwithstanding, however, the revolutions and politi-
cal machinations in the capital, the people in the country, as
far as they were let alone, were growing richer and richer, and
by the second half of the eighties clever people in Montevideo
saw that the time for a really big deal /arrived i on May 2M-,I8S'^
the organic law of the National BanK was passed according to
which the capital of the Bank was to be ten million pesos ( ther.
is no more any talk of hundreds of thousands, as was the case

some twenty years In gold and silver » the proportion to be
fixed by the Government; the banK obtained the right to Issue
banXnotes of a nominal value exceeding ten pesos to an amount o/
twice Its realised capital, and banknotes from ten pesos to ten
centeslmos to an amount not exceeding U-Cffo of Its capital, but
was Obliged to Keep a metallic reserve of not less than 25^ of
its banknote Issue. It obtained also many other privileges, e.g.
freedom from taxation for Its banknotes, shares etc., and an
attempt was even made to give It a monopoly of banknote issue.
All this, however, did not save It from a noisy failure within
three years from the date of its foundation, fbr an outsider it
Is clear that such a bank could not help failing. An issue of
twenty eight million pesos of banknotes in a small country like
Uruguay where people were wise enough to know that a real Eng-
lish sovereign was at all times better than an Uruguaian pro-
mise to pay such a coin, would be by itself quite sufficient to
ruin such a bank, but when we learn of its loaning, contrary to
its charter, over four million pesos to the (rovernment , and of
Its speculstions <if every kind (in which it was actively Joined
by the G-overnment ) we can only wonder that it existed as long as
three years. jYewill not recounted here in detail how the
Government unsuccessfully tried, in 1890, to reestablish the
bank by providing it, under the guarantee of the Government,
with a capital of 22.000.000 pesos, and by declaring that as
long as its banknotes are paid in gold by the bank, the Govern-
ment will accept no other notes in its offices. The crisis of
1890 put a stop to the execution of this project as well as to
that Of the Mortgage Bank ( the last being outside of the presen'
discussion )
.

Ve arrive thus at the peidiod of the BanK of the Kepubllc
which was established by the law of March 13, IS96. Its Initial
capital of five million pesos in gold was obtained by a state
loan of a nominal value of 7.83^.900 pesos, and the organic law
of the BanK stated that its capital was to be ten million pesos
actual, represented by 12.000.000 pesos nominal In $wo series
of shares of 6..000.000 pesos each series (the second series has
not yet been realised), the first series to be transferred to
the Btate in payment for the capital provided and privileges
granted; at least M-Ofj of the capital were to be employed in es-
tablishing branch offices in various parts of the country: all
the deposits in, and banKnotes of, the BanK, were guaranteed by-
the State; the Bank was to have a right to issue, up to 50/j of
its realised capital, banlcnotes of a value under ten pesos, re-
deemable in gold or silver as the BanK might choose; as soon as
the concessions granted to other banKs with respect to the issue
of banlcnotes expire, they were not to be renewed, and the BanK
of the Republic was to enjoy finally a monopoly in this respect
(at present the Italian BanK of Uruguay is the only one having,
besides the BanK of the Republic, the right to issue banKnotes,
but its concession in this respect expires next year, and will
not be renewed); alllthe legal deposits were to be made in this
BanK exclusively, as well as all deposits made by private indi-
viduals to guarantee the State in the execution of contracts
for public worKs; the BanK was to have a right to issue banKnote
above ten pesos, redeemable in gold, up to twice Its realised
capital, Keeping a gold cash reserve of not less than ^<yfo of
its circulating Issue and deposits; the BanK was also to act as
treasurer of the Government. There were several provisions in-

tended to Keep the administration o the BanK from speculating
with Its funds and from abuses of credit; the G-overnment was
not aiaiowed to borrow without special collateral more than one
million pesos, as long as the capital did not exceed 5. COO. 000
pesos. As long as the second series of the shares remained not
realised, the hoard of directors consisting of six members was
to be named by the Executive, and approved by the Senate.
The aiuOunt of banlcnotes Issued is now somewhat in excess of
16. 000.000 pesos which is an amount about which two opinions
are permissible. On one hand, about 15 pesos per Inhabitant in
a community •/mainly an agricultural character, in addition to
the large amount of gold coin in use, seems to be rather too
much, since such a community does not require as many instru-
ments of circulation as a manufacturing or trading community of
the same size. On the other hand, the construction of new har-
bors (e.g. at Rosario) and railways/rom Imported capital allows
the country to Keep a larger stocK of money in circulation than
would be the case even in a richer community working with its
domestic capital exclusively. Anyhow, there is a proof that the
Uruguaian currency is not too much, if It/ is at all. In excess
of the actual requirements of the country. The financial diffi-
culties of 1907 > though happening at a time when the Uruguaian
finances were in a much weaker state than they are now, caused
practically no difficulties as far as the circulation of bank-
notes was concerned, and the rise of the national credit of the
Republic will certainly tend to strengthen also the value of
the notes Issued by its Bank of State, as long as it does not
exceed reasonable limits.

This Historical account was necessary - among other things -
to answer the question which naturally rises In connection
with every currency having banKnotes payable In gold, and that
is: Is tne currency sound, Is It on a flrra basis or not?
Well, it is, and It Is not. This may not seem quite clear
at first sight, but the following Is isXjS^irfed t/O explain It.
Every banknote currency, as far as Its soundness Is con-
cerned, depends on two classes of causes: economic and moneta-
ry-politic, or, in other words, on the tendency of the wealth
of the country -^o Increase or decrease,, and on the tendency
Of the banicnote circulation to Keep within or without reasoH-
able limits. If we apply these two standards of InvestTlgatlon
to Uruguay, we see that as far as the production of wealth is
concerned, the currency is certainly safe. The population of the
country is now well over a million, nearly exclusively white,
and belongs for the most part to those races of Southern iiJurope
which seem to maKe the best settlers for South America. The
climate of the country is such that, according to the opinion
Of Dr. AXers (A History of south America, p. 29M-)^even the Uru-
gualan adiflinistrat ion could not injure in. The distribution of
landed property is not on a very healthy - economically - basis
at present: about 15. 000. 000 hectare belong to about 10.000 per-
sons, while the remaining 32. 000 proprietors have ajaong them
less than 3. 000. 000 hectars, but there is a strong tendency
now to breaK up the large properties into smaller parts. The
banKs help this tendency by freely giving loans for the pur-
chase of small farms, and the Government is :'iust now consider-
ing the realisation of a loan of 10,000.000 pesos for the same
purpose. The chief Industries in the country are agriculture.

cattle-raising, and packing, tha most simple, steady, and, with
the present tendency of prices, the most promising. The mineral
wealth Of the country is also very considerable, although with
the present population it cannot yet be taken seriously into
account. The country has 2.53^ lo'iis. (about I.yoOmiles) of rail-
roads which are all guaranteed by the (rovernment , but the fact
that the Government docs not have to pay a cent on the guarant-
ees shows beyond doubt that there is plenty of life in the
country. Of course, here again there is still|^ plenty to do:
in some parts of tW - country the bullock is as yet the stand-
ard method of coirjnunicatlon, and some of the smaller lines are
narrow-gauge, but there are ready projects for about 3.17^ kms
.
more, and about half of these projects have, as it appears^ ser-
ious financial backing, among other places, on the extremely
wealthy and altogether rather conservative French market-whlch
is a good sign in itself.
The total Of external commerce, as shown by the returns
of the custom house, rose from thirty one million pesos in 1877
to sixty eight millions in I906 which la certainly a good show-
ing for a country of about one million inhabitants. We see, how-
ever, from the latest reports that the returns for 1909 are
eighty three million pesos, or a rise of about 22^ in four year.
The indebtedness of the State is very large - 136 millions;
still in 1909 the country not only covered all its expenses
and paid the Interest on the debt, but had a surplus of abd)iit
/J.^^OO.OOO pesos which brought the total surplus during Presi-
dent Williman's administration to about 6.000.000 pesos. One of
the most Important factors is, however, the large amount of

gold coins contained, and for the most part concealed, in tiie
country. Tlie writer has toeen unai^l© as yet to find from the ba-
lances or the banKs the amount of deposits (most of the foreign
banKs show their total, and not iJruguaian, deposits), but it
Is probably in the nelbourhood of lOO.OOO^OOOpesos; this does,
not yet, however, snow the actual monetary wealth of the county
since many Urugualans are still, not without reason, afraid to
entrust their money to banKs. As a proof of this, the famous
case of the Chilian "condores" may be quoted. In 1896 it was
discovered that there is in the country a large number of Chi-
lian gold coins, called "conderes" , of light weight, and a law
was passed providing that such coins should be acceptable In
payraents only if their weight does not fall below a certain
standard. This practically threw them out of circulation, and
allowed the banKers to buy them by weight and export as bullion.
About 3.700.000 pesos in condores were exported during five
wecKs, without putting any strain on the circulation, which
shows what a large amount of gold there is in the country. One
might expect it, though, from the fact that the importation of
money largely exceeds the exportation: in 1906 12.^00.000 pe-
sos were imported, and 7.^70.000 exported. This state of affairs
will probably continue as long as foreign capital is invested
in the country, and, from the consideration of the general si-
tuation, there are many reasons to believe that the period of
foreign investments in the country is only at the beginning.
All this tends to produce an Impression that the Urugual-
an currency is on a reasonably sound basis. Indeed, its histo-
ry is perhaps the best proof of its soundness. If after all the
abuses which partly were, and partly were not , described above.

the country required only ten years of comparative peace and ho-
nest administration to redeem all the sins of the past, and to
create a ggod national credit and convert Ihle hanKnotes, this
shows that there is plenty of vitality in the hcpuhllc of Orien-
tal Uruguay.
There is, however, another class of phenomena which deserves
consideration, and maKes the answer to the question as to the
soundness of Uruguaian currency less certain than would appear
fDom what was said above. As a matter of fact, the banK failures
and flat money during the whole period from 1868 to the end of
the nineteenth century were in nearly every case due either to
the Government "horrowing" the money from the banKs, or, as In
the case of the National BunK, involving it, and going with it,
Into disastrous speculations. Just now we see in Uruguay an
efficient and honest administration, and prosperity in the coun-
try. But how long this will last, no one can tell. The fire of
revolutions and mutinies has not yet heen put out entirely,
although it is to a certain extent true th^^t the present Govern-
ment with its ability to command considerable financial and mi-
litary res^ources is much better able to preserve the existing
regime than was any of the unripe and moneyless dictatures of
the nineteenth century.
Uruguay is a comparatively small country, and it is much
easier to ruin its monetary system than to do iO in a big count-
ry llKe united States. Here it would be necessary to issue some
thing llKe a billion dollars in grcenbacKs before they would
fall 10 jz^ in a dollar, while in Uruguay it would be enC)ugh for
a revolutionary government to pass a law llKe that of 1873 i In

virtue Of which every Inhabitant was to be allowed to write,
print or lithograph ^ttnXnotes at his heart's desire, and the
whole fine structure of the Urugualan currency would fall to the
ground In less than one year. It must be, however, noticed that
generally the currency Is considered sound If It can last as
long as the sovereignty of the country, or the form of govern-
ment, which created it. If a departure from this rule has to be
made In the case of Uruguay ( and other south American currencies
as well). It is only for the reason that the period of compara-
tive rest In the country has been so short that there Is as yet
no perfect assurance of its further preservation. The country
seems to be, however, rich and grov/lng in productive forces,
and, after all, In the long run. It Is not the banKers and go-
vernments, but the farmers and other producers of actual wealth
that maKe the banknote equivalent to gold.

BHAZIL.
The year 1897 was one of the blacKest of a series of blacK
years for the Brazilian finances. The revolution not only caus-
ed Immense direct expenses to the Government, but had a most un-
favourable Influence on the general commercial situation of the
country. The high prices of coffee in the early nineties lured
the farmers of the country into giving- up the production of ce-
reals, and devoting their entire attention to coffee plantation^.
This also had a very disastrous effect on the general situation.
Coffee plantations require considerable expenses during from
five to six years before they begin to yield any income, and
when the country in a rush turned to growing coffee, it not only
decreased for the time being its yearly output of wealth, but
had to import large and ever growing quant ites of food from ab-
road (the importation of rice rose from 866,000 sacKs in I89I
to 1,198,000 sfucKs in 1895; of maize from 858,000 sacKs to 919,
000 sacXs during the same period). And when in 1897 Brazil was
ready to put on the marXet such a m^ass of coffee that the local
marXet was unable to supply sacKs for it, prices, as could be
easily expected with regard to a commodity of limited consump-
tion, fell very rapidly (according to reports of the Co.':panhla
Centres Pastoris do Brazil the same coffee which was marKeted
at 195^284- for 15 Xllos in 1893 could fetch only 12*6663 in 1897,
and went down to 9^962 in 189^. The railways, both belonoing to
the State and built by private companies with guaranteed bonds,
were running at a deficit, and making the situation especially
hard for the Government owing to the fact that most of the bonds
were Issued abroad, and involved therefore payment of interest
and amortisation in gold. In Canudos an insurrection of a semi-

political, seml-rellglous ©aaractep was still eiOing on, and al-
though Its suppression was called in the official language of Ute
time an expedition of military police, it proved to be very ex-
pensive. The financial admlnlstraatlon was conducted neither ve-
ry wisety, nor very economically, and as a result of all these
causes by the end of the year 1.^97 the Government was absolute-
ly unable to meet its obligations with regard to foreign holder.5
of its securities. The banKlng system and currency were cifsorga-
nised as much as the rest of the financial system, and on the
whole "everything proved to be bad", as a contemporary wrote.
j^considerat ion of the history of the monetary and banKlng si-
tuation up to that time will show why it could not be otherwise.
In the years 1890 and IS9I specTilatlon in stocks reached It^
height. In 189X^3X3 new companies were formed with a capital of
over a billion dollars, and things reached such a stage that a
price was paid to thoi^Jse wno could suggest new names for compa-
nies. Naturally this could not last, and In 1892 failures began.
The monetary situation at this time was as follows: the bank-
notes Issued bt^ the Treasury amounted to X76.6 mills., and the
the Issues of the banks gave 3^4-6. X mills, more, "nrlnglng the to-
tal up to 513.7 mills. The banknotes Issued by the State had no
specific guarantee, while those Issued by the banks were guaran-
teed by a deposit with the State of special bonds ( apollces ) to
an amount of 81.2 mills., and gold to an amount of 95.8 mills.,
but out of this gold the Minister of Finances Ruy Barbosa spent
39. 8 mills, to pay off tne debt of the State of 1889, and La600.
000 were loaned by his two successors to several banks on their
simple notes, with no tangible collateral, so that practically
the only guarantee for this large issue of banknotes consisted

In a coEpcratlvely small amount of apollces which ^moreover under
the existing conditions could hardly be ve'dllseau/^on-
By a special arrangement with some of the banKs (Banco Emiss-
or da Bahia, Banco de Credito Popolar, and Banco da Bahia ) the
Government was able not only to stop them from increasing their
issues, to which they had a right, but^ actually reduce/ the cir-
culation by four millions:- a good step, but far too insignifi-
cant in so dangerous a situation, particularly owing to the fact-
that at the same time the foreign banKs which had branches in
Brazil were actively speculating with Brazilian banKnotes on
the bear side, and by the end of the year succeeded in bringing
the # of a nominal value of 27 pence English to only 10 d.
Finally the situation reached such a point thqt the Govern-
ment was afraid to risK even the delay whicn might be cal/Ied by
the discussion of the requi red measures by the legislative
Assembly, and promulgated the decree of December 17, 1^92 on
Its own responsibility. "The time to act has come", wrote the
Minister in his report, " and a &overnment which does not find
the courage to accept the high responsibilities whicn the cir-
cumstances throw upon it is not worthy to lead a nation: the
necessity is a law in itself". The question which confronted
the Government was how to reduce the excessive currency of the
banks. It could not be done by depriving the banKs of tnelr
rights to issue banKnotes, because that would be equivalent to
banKrupting the banks, and might lead to otherwise dangerous coi^'
plications. What the decree of IS92 did was to bring about, wit^
the consent of their shareholders of course, a f\ision of the two
largest native banks in the country - the Banco da Republica
dos Estados Unldos do Braail and the Banco do Brasil - into on:

Banco da Republlca do Brazil. The new banK wasShave a capital o^
T90 mills, (this capital was six months later reuced to I50,Q00
000), and all issues of Its banloiotes were henceforth to be gua-
ranteed by special eold-apollces bearing z-^jo Interest, said Inte-
rest to accrue as long as there was a difference between the va-
lue of the deposit and that of the banknotes Issued ( the apoll-
ces were to belong to the BanK, but to be Kept at the Treasury).
The Bank was to accept th responsibility for all the banKnote
Issue, and, within a period of twelve months, to unify them In
one Issue. It was to become the depositor of the current account
Of the Treasury, had to open agencies In London and various iSuro-
pean and American places, and was generally to act In lieu of a
BanK Of State. The BanK was granted the exclusive privilege of
Issuing bankncites, which were to be guaranteed, to 50^ of their
value, by a deposit In gold, and payable at sight and In gold.
The banXnotes of all the other banks were to be gradually with-
drawn from circulation. On November 23 of that year the
issues of banknotes were distributed among the banks as follows
(In millions of Brazilian
Banco da xepubllca 277.0
Banco de Gredlto Popolar... 29.
Banco Unl§o de Sao Paulo.... 10.
Banco Emlssor de Pernambuco . . . 15.5
Banco Kmlssor de Bahla... 9.5
Banco Emlssor do Norte.... I.O
Banco da Bahla.... i|.0
Total.. 3i|-6.T
Out of this total the Sfei4-.000.000 of the Banco da Bahla were
taken over by the Government In virtue of a previous agreement
(mentioned above), so that the nev/ bank had to take over from
other banks only 69 mills, which would not be a very hard task,
If the bank were on a solvent foundation, were not overcapita-
lised, and sincerely IntendcW to limit the banknote clrculat-

Ion to what was actually required by the volume of the country'^
business. Neither of these conditions was, however, In evidence.
In fact the same decree which created the Banco da Republlca do
Brasil authorised It to Isuue, for the support of the national
Industries which were llKely to develop^ 100.000.000 In bonua .
These bonus were made to bearer. In amounts from 200?^ to I.000#,
were to be redeemed within 20 years from the date of Issue, pale/
¥^ Interest, and were to be accepted at par by all the offices
Of the Government . Such bonus are nothing else but a hybrid
form Of currency. They are not banKiiotes^ since , under the terms
of their issue, they cannot be presented for exchange into gold
by their holders; at the same time they cannot be considered in
the same light as other state securities since they are accept-
ed at par by the Government in payment of taxes. The fact that
they bear an interest maKes their value vary somewhat from one
end of the semester to the other, and^ln general^ if theydlffer
fDom banXnotes as far as overcrowding the circulation is con-
cerned, the difference is not in favour of the bonus.
still less favourable was the situation as regards the sol-
vency and solidity of the banK itself. Without going here into
detains (for which 5«e Calogeras , pp. 257-263 ), it may be stat-
ed that at the time of the combinaj-lon of the two banKs their
real capitals did not exceed 26.000.000$ which was very far
from the nominal capital of 156 mills, with which the Bank was
supposed to start. It was not, in fact, a watered stocK: it
was pure water with a blocK of stocK floating here and there,
and, as if to maKe the situation still worse, the law allowed
the BanK to accept in payment of debts at par its own shares
which were at that time quoted on the marKet at about 20^,9 of

Ihelr nominal value. With all these drawbacks It might be, how-
ever^ possible to place the banK on a solid financial foundation
by a conservative management of Its business and extre/ne economy
In expenses. As a matter of fact, mainly for speculative purpose^
no such things were even attempted. The large Brazl llan banKs
used to pay dividends of ¥,o per annum, and the Banco da Repub-
lica do Brasil continued to do the same. But on its nominal
capital Of 156. 000.000* meant something llKe 35^a on its actual
worKing capital of 26. 000 contgs, and that was of course a rate
Of dividend which no ordinary banking business could yield. The
dividends were therefore simply taken out of the working capitao
of the bank, a condition which would alone be fully sufficient
\^rec/fcin institution o/^credtt:
to ll6Brd ebre^inariD^QiatiBP «6T, tie9Jfts«LStTfifcitiave s^eft,
The decree of December 17, IB92, as we have seen, was not a
measure calculated to place the banking business of the country
on a solid foundation, and the events of the period nearly irome-
dlately following it were of such a character that even the
little good that was in the proposed scheme had no chance to be
of any use.
The political situation in the country, from the coup d'
Etat of November 3, I89I, was never in a state of stable equi-
librium, and became woBse and worse as time went on. The South
of the country, as well as the Navy, had each many grievances
of its own, and, by September 1893, both were in an open revolt
which threatened the existence of the G-overnment as well as the
unity Of tne country. Intra armis silent leges, and the Govern-
ment made extensive use of this rule, especially in monetary
matters. As we nave seen above, the Government und> rtook, in
accordance with the decree of Lecenber 17 to redeem 100.000

contos in banlaiotes by using for this purpose the deposits of
former banks. In the first half of 1893 5.527 contos were re-
deemed, but when the troubles began, the Government not only
I
turned the rest of the deposits {about 29.000 contos) to the
war-fund, but Issuea for the saiae purpose 83.000 contos more
In paper-money. This led of course to a rapid fall In the rate
Of exchange of paper-money, the average of which In August 1893
was 12 1/6 d., and came down to 10 3/l6 d. In December IS93, an
to 9id. In June 189^.
It was not, nowever, the monetary politics of the Government
alone which brought down the rate of exchange so rapidly. The
mutiny of the Navy practically put the port of hlo out of busi-
ness. The whole commercial machinery of the country stopped,
•one had nothing better to do than to wait for better days", as
a Brazilian writer says, and when the better days, or at least
the end of the mutiny, came, the country was In every respect
covered by ruins. The naval defense was desorganlsed, most of
the Important commercial relations broKen, the people In a statj
Of torpor, three provinces (Elo Grande, Santa catarlna, and Pa-
rana) In Insurrection, and the general situation such that no
legitimate business of any Importance could be thought of,, but
there were plenty of opportunities for commercial adventures on
a pseudo-patriotic basis.
When the Government of Mr. Barros, with Mr. Rodrlgues Alves
as Minister of Finance, undertook In the middle of November 189*
to bring the State bacK Into the regular channels, Brazil had,
with Its financial agents In London, barely enough to pay Its
expenses until the end of the year, and even that was made pos-
sible only by obtaining a delay In the payment of L300.OOO, due

In the beginning of Deceraber, on the two cruisers ordBred by the
preceding Government on the last day of Its existence. Meanwhile
the expenses were very heavy, and could not well be cut down at
once. There were expensive celebrations In honour of the ooramis-
slon frora Uruguay whlcn came to taKe part In the delivery of me-
dals for the Paraguay war; the revolt In Hlo Grande cost enorm-
ous sums; the payment of the apollces approached, and the settle-
ment of the claims In connection with the civil wa^ could not
be delayed much longer. There were still other large payments
to be made. In 1893 the Treasury of the State bought the loan
Issued by the Companhla Esrtrada de Ferro Oeste de Mlnas . The
money was spent since then, but the stipulajrcd payments had to
be made to the Company for the construction of its lines. The
banKs also insisted on being paid the damages caused to them
by the withdrawal of their right to Isuue banKnotes. The State
of Sao Paulo claimed the 5. 000 centos of taxes which the Union
had temporarily levied, and the railroads wanted to be paid for
the transportation of the troops to Klo Grande.
In general, the new Government was rather favourably re-
ceived both by tne commercial classes at home, and the banKers
In London, but the state of affairs in the country was as yet
far too unsettled to maKe possible a loan large enough to place
the finances of Brazil on a permanent basis. The general feel-
ing was that the public would nol? taKe it, and the only thing
to do was to issue short-terra notes for an amount sufficient to
satisfy tne most pressing needs. Such notes were Issued: at hom«?
In December 1S9M- - ^^.606 contos, at kfo Interest, payable In
six months, and in January IS95 - 500 contos at ¥h payable In
four months, and 1. 000 contos p^^iyable In three months. Abroad

drafts were issued for L 2.000.000, at 97°^, and a deduction of
for coinralsslons and stamp duty, payable in nine, twelve, and
fifteen months.
Mention was made above of commercial adventures. apeculatlO'?
on the price of gold was the most prominent and also the most
dangerous of them, but could not be stopped at once owing to the
fact that the whole situation, financial and political, was un-
usually favourable to its development. The banknote circulation
at the end of 189^ amounted to 712.358 contos (including the
83.000 contos issued by the Government during the revolution-)^,
and the 75. 000 contos loaned to the banKs ) , and there were 80.
000 in bonus. On the other hand, to cover this large issue of
instruments of payment there remained in th e Treasury practi-
cally nothing of the ninety three odd millions of the gold re-
serve, and less than 100.000 contos in unsalable securities.
There was ther^'flJoce plenty of reasons to thlnK that the Brazi-
lian banKnote was worth Just as much as one was Inclined to pay
for it, and hardly more, with a good organization of the banKs
and stock-oxchanges^tnat might not have led to any particular
difficulties^ but unfot?tunately for the country the specula-
tive market was at that time quite unadequately organised : there
were no definite and strictly enforced laws regulating the pro-
fession of brokers, and any promoter of get-rich-quick schemes
of I889-I89I whom the subsequent political events saved from
his deserved place in Jail could, and often did, eng?-.ge in the
the business of brokerage in securities and f^jnds. The method
of speculation was extremely simple: one bought or sold drafts
on foreign markets, in the hope of getting a "covering" wnen
the exports arrived in foreign ports, or of paying tne diffe-

rence in the other case, and when in the end of 1894 there
occured a hitch in the exports of coffee, and the exporting
business was generally slow, the speculators tried to obtain a
permission to draw against the none-too-plentiful resi^ources of
the Treasury in London. When the Minister of Finances refused to
sanction this plan, he was bitterly accused of lacK of patrio-
tlsm and narrowmlndedness . ^11 this tended to raaKe the outlooK
rather gloomy, but in reality thlnfoS were not as bad as they
nlLiht have appeared at first sight , and in order to understand
the situation as It really was^one must not lose sight of the
most Important fact, viz. the size of the country and the vast-
ness of its natural ressources. Wnlle people ^oght in Rlo-
v'hiLe
Grande, and the Navy was busy burning the port of Klo, the fa-
A
zendelros in the Interior continued to worK in their slow way.
As the Government pointed out in its report for 189^, the land-
owners became poorer owing to their speculations and mortgages
on the lands, but the production of the lands was Increasing,
and the following table may show that the curve representing
the development of the trade has a very different curvature
from that of the budgets or m netary circulation:
Year IfltttigftBalance of banimotes In Average rate ofV trade"" circulation exchange
.
1890 ^ft. 9 ' -^5.1 299.0 22 9/l6
1891 50.2 95.1 513.7 29/32
1892 -21.0 50.3 561.2 12 1/32
1893 15.0 277.^ 631.8 II 19/32
189^ - 102. i^- 259.5 712.3 10 3/32
The period from the beginning of 1895 to June 1898 ( time of
the adoption of the Funding Scheme) may be properly considered

to be a period of the liquidation of the economic and politi-
cal excesses of the previous decade, of which only the first
can be here considered. It was truly the darKest period of Bra-
zlll-tsn economic history. The rapid and wide varations in the
rate of exchange of currency made impossible healthy coiaiaerclal
relations with foreign countries. Import operations became prac-
tically a gamble, and Brazil very soon lost its former position
Of distributing centre for the immense "bacK country". The home
Industries were also in a very precarious state. Most of the
vast enterprises planned during the megalomania of the end of
the eighties were either unfinished, or not? worKlng, while the
few which did worK produced only a very small share of what they
were capable of doing. We shall see later on how on these ruins
a new, more modestly planned and thrpefore stronger, Industry
arose, but In 1895-6 the products of the Brazilian factories
were poor in quality and expensive, while the owners were, with
hardly any exceptions, all the time on the verge of banKruptcy,
and lome well beyond It. In agriculture the coffee-raising
States suffered from over-production , and fall of prices due
to a bearish campaign of European speculators, while the North-
ern states (Bahia, Sergipe, Alagoas , Pernarabuco , and Parahyba )
were heavily strucK by the united States tariff of August 28,
189^, which put a duty otf ^J-O^o ad valcirem on sugar, the chief prx
duct of the agriculture of these States.
All these circumstances, together with the speculation on
the rate of exchange, and evident disorganisation of the cur-
rency and finances of the country, caused a general desponden-
cy which was felt throughout the country, both In the large
cities and the fazendas of the interior. The only way out of
It wfis to fnllnw thff old llbtiraT program : "peao? reform ^ and '

retrenchment", and, as far as circumstances permitted, that was
on the whole the policy adopted by the Government.
One or the first measures of general Importance was the
highly protective tariff of 1895 • We have seen at)0ve how abnor-
mal was the situation of BrazlJlan Industry at that time. Of
course, It was the fault of the manufacturers themse^-ves that
they have built immense factories where there was no need for
them, and a State has no business to save gamblers from paying
their losses. But the speculators were there clamouring loudly
for protection, and using all their powerful business and so-
cial connections to obtain a tariff whlrh would save them at the
cost of the welfare of the consumers, while the consumer was
merely a thoretical quantity somewhere in the bacKwoods of the
country. A parliament of a Latin nation, according to the
opinion of Mr. Calogeras, the learned historian of the Brazi-
lian currency, is peculiarly liable to be Influenced by senti-
mental currents of the Kind created in their favour by the
protectionists, and when the leader of that party, Mr. Perelra,
happened to be, owing to the illness of President de Moraes,
for a short time at the head of affairs, he had no difficulty
in persuading the Houses to accept the teriff of 1895, which
led to two things: made lifijj more expensive, and, by Increas-
Ing I'n&t exports, and decreasing the Imports, made the tasK
of the central financial administration still more difficult.
Mr. Alves, the then Minister of Finance, tried to reestablish
the payment of part of the custom dul?ies In gold, but the Con-
#
According to the constitution, the duties on the exports
went to the Federated States, and those on the imports to the
central Government.

gress did not approve of It, and thus left to the Minister only
one way open - that of purely financial operations.
There v/ere two problems which required limnedlate attention:
the redemption of at least a part of tne lianKnotes, and the
settlement of the claims of the national banKs In connection
with the withdrawal of their rights to Issue banKnotes. The
first was partly attained by the Issue of the loan of 1895, of
a nominal aiLount of 100.000 contos In paper, at 5^b Interest,
Issued at 95^ and very rapidly oversubscribed, a fact which, con-
sidering the state of affairs In the country, could with Justice
be pointed out to the forelKn capitalists as a proof of the hlg^
confidence of Brazilian Investors In the policy of their Govern-
ment . When the loan was Issued, It was promised that half of It
will be used for the redemption of banJcnotes; as a matter of
fact, only 30^ were so used, and It hardly produced any Impres-
sion on the money market because everybody Knew of the heavy
deficits In the budget. This part of the program was distinctly
a failure.
The Government was more fortunate In Its dealings with the
banKs. As a fair exaiaple of wk^t the banKs wanted to get from
the Government may be quoted the calculation presented by the
Banco Emlssor de Pernambuco. This banK had deposited In the
Treasury L ^75.077, or, at the current rate of exchange, II.I23.
^25f . To this the banK added 5^0 on what this sum would amount
to If It were converted Into gold apollces, or 26.130.150?^ whlc>i
left, after deducting thde amount of banknotes In circulation
( 15.558.200$ ), a balance in favour or the banljbf 21.70^1.302$,
but the banK was willing to compromise on IM-.OOO contos. Such
a demand was all the more characteristic that, according to the

charter or the banX, and the Currency Acts of 1890, the banx
had no right to Issue notes for more tlin twice Its deposit in
gold, so that, within the strict sense of the law, the banK in-
stead Of being paid an indemnity could be indicted for fraud.
The other banKs made claims of a similar nature, and the
(rovernment flatly refused to consider such a ruinous settlement.
The banKs th ccn submitted another plan which was finally accept-
ed, viz.: the banKs had to deposit gradually in all sorts of
banKnotes (i.e. not necessarily their own) the ntoinal amount
issued by them, and the Government was to return to them a pro-
portional amount of the apolices fpom their deposits, such an
arrangement to continue until the total withdrawal of the banK-
notes from circulation. It is by no means clear why the brmKs
have been willing to adopt a settlrment fDom which they could
derive so little profit.
The success of the internal loan and the firmness of the
Government in settling the claims of the banKs have helped it
to maKe 'a loan in London of L6. 000. 000, at interest and
aiaort isat ion, Issued at 85^3. The Brazilian economists thlnK
that the issue of this loan was a mistaKe. It is however doubt-
ful whether the Government could avoid maKing it . It had to pay
the L2. 000. 000 in drafts issued in the beginning of 1895. as^ to
cover the expenses of building the battleships and restoring th€
war materials destroyed during the preceding revolution. The
Government had also to find some source to cover the deficit
of 18.901.^4-111 in the budget for 1895, well as to form some
fiind abroad which would permit it to Keep away from the unstea-
dy local money marKet. Mr. Calogeras thlnKs thv^t it is a very
bad plan to cover budgetary deficits by loans: it v/ould probab-

ly be more coprect to say that It Is a bad plan to have deficit
Irrespective or the methods of coverlny them.
In general the outloolc In 1896 was certainly brighter than
in the preceding year. It is true that the price of coffee was
rather low, and the disorder in the monetary circulation was
Just as bad as before, but the Government sucoteded in obtain-
ing a rifle in custom duties of 25^, Placed unde;r a stricter re-
gulation the brokers, suppressed the, traffic in rebate certifi-
cates for custom duties (guias), and did a good deal towards
putting bacx in working order the railroads and other methods
of transportation totally disorganised during the war. The orga-
nisation Of the Leopoldina Railway Co. which tooK over the busi-
ness of the former Companhia Ferral das Estradas de Ferro at-
tracted universal attention, and was considered as a proof that
the worst period was over. Now was the time for a thorough re-
form of the monetary ell?Duld(t)ilion, the most pressing need of the
time, and for that retrenchment which the llbe^ral party used to
maKe part of its war-cry.
The law Of December 9, 1896, was the first step towards the
reconstruction of the currency system. It established definitely
the important and fundamental principle that nobody but the
state, not even the highly privileged Banco da Hepubllca, will
henceforth have a right to issue banknotes, and that all the
guarantee deposits made in connection with their issues were to
become the property of the Treasury; that the bonus v/hich were
up to then good only for transactions betv/een the Government
and lis debtors, and of which large amounts were collected in
the Custom-House of Rio and the Banco da Republlca, were to be
treated as, and replaced by, banknotes of the state. The with-

drawal of the p&per-money was to be continued until the normal
rate of exchange of 27 d. was reached, and the following ress^our-
ces were to be used for this purpose: the Interest on the bonus
converted Into non-lnterest-bearlng banknotes; tne payments of
the Banco da Republlca which It was expected to maKe, according
to an arrangement to be agreed upon, In settlement of Its debts
to the Treasury ( It was expected that not less than 100. ooo con-
tos would come Into the Treasury from that source); budgetary ^
surpluses, and finally certain parts of the revenue obtained
from the proposed leasing of the Federal railroads. It was decid-
ed to retire 10^ of the banKnotes In circulation in 1897, 15^ 1*^
1895, 2&lo In 1899, and 25^ lnI900, or seventy percent of the
total circulation In five years, and that circulation was at
the end or 1896 (In contoa):
Issued by the State.... 780.328. 6
Issued by the banXs... 3^-0.71^. 3
Total 1.121.0^3
A comparison of this vast sum of actual banknotes In circula-
tion with the problematic sources of cash to be used for their
withdrawal maKcs It practically useless to criticize the law of
December 1896. It was promulgated under the Influence of the pa-
nic created by the fall in the price of coffee, and feverish
buying Of foreign goods prompted by the Introduction of the new
tariff. But the law which Intended to redeem seven hundred mill
Ions in banknotes from budgetary surpluses at a time of regular
and practically unavoidable deficits (in 1895 - 18.901 contos,
in 1896 - 1^4-0. 392 contos) was a dead measure from the day of
its birth, and the money market went from bad to worse notwith-
standing its publication. In the first half of 1896 the average

rate of exchange In pence was 9.33 » a^i^ lowest 9-}; In 1897
»
l,e^ after the puiDlicatlon of the l&w of Deceint)er 1896, the ave-
rage for the first hf^rf fell down to 8. 05 with the lowest quo-
tation of 7 7/16, while In the second half of 1897 the average
was only 7.35, with a minimum rate of 7 l/32 in Leceffiber 1897.
lleanwhlle It became also clear that the project of advantageous-
ly leasing th e state railroads from which was to come a large
part of the money for the redemption of banKnotes, could not be
carried out, and the fall of the rate of excnange. In January
1898, to 6 25/32, while being only natural under the existing
circumstances, strucx the popular mind so forclblythat even the
5^ apollces which held their ground fairly well all the time,
went down all of a sudden, something had to be done pretty
qulcKly, and of a really substantial character, if the situat-
ion was to be saved at all, and the solution of the problem was
found in the important measure known in Brazil under the Englis:
name "Funding-Scheme".
This scheme which was adopted only after the utter failure
of an attempt to issue in London a large loan, and the defi-
nite refusal of the agents of Brazil, the banking house N.M.
Rothschild and Sons, to support any new schemes until a suffi-
cient fund was created in London to make the Government inde-
pendent of the Rio money market, was formed and carried out
under exceptionally favourable conditions owing to the hearty
support of the persons then at the helm of the Brazilian admi-
nistration, and to the powerful interests which promoted it on
the European side. The Funding-Scheme represented mainly the
wishes Of a rich and respectable group of English holders of
Brazilian securities, men wh(i bought them for investment, were

on the whole far fromtjrjf ing to sceK any side profltd in specula-
tion; they were naturally deeply concerned In the growing depre-
ciation Of their holdings and the possibility of even the payme«ti
Of Interest being stopped, a possibility at that time actually
under discussion both in Rio and London.
The contract for the Funding Loan was signed on June 15, 1898,
and was based on the following principles: the novernraent recog
nlsed its inability to pay in current money the interest and
araortisatlon on the external loans, the Internal loan of 1879
»
the loan of the Corcpanhia Estrada de Ferro Oeste de Mlnas, and
various railway loans guaranteed by the state, and proposed to
pay the Interest on all these loans ( enumerated In the actual
contract, and by Calogeras, p. 326) In 5^ gold funding bonds,
Issued as required for this purpose. Al]^mort Isatlons were to
be stopped altogether until June 30, I9II. The maximum amount
of these bonds was not to exceed LIO. 000.000 (ultimately only
LS. 613.717 were Issued). They were to be issued at par, with
quarterly paid Interest, and were to be redeemed in 50 years
from July I, I9II> the Government having the right to redeem
them at par at any previous date. Noloans could be Issued by
the Government previous to July I, 1901, unless by a special
agreement with the Rothschild's banK In London. Beginning from
i!!Poa 1st January 1899, simultaneously with the issue of the honh,
the Government had to deposit their value In banknotes , at the
rate of exchange of 18 d., with one of the following banKs: Lon
don and River Plate, London and Brazilian, and Brgsllianische
BanX fuer Deutschland, the banioiotes to be v/lth^-drawn from cir-
culatlon and destroyed. This agreement did not cover the loan
of 1897.

It would De difficult to dnflne precisely the benefits which
were derived by Brazilian finance and commerce fror. the adoptlo
of the Funding Scheme. In the end of April 1898 the rate of ex-
change was only ^fd. , and In May a comralttee of Importers wait-
ed on the President of the Republic, and asKed him to help to
free the marXet from "the dally growing terror of a panic » a
terror dominating all and m«naclng everything". The respite
granted to the cj-overnment by the Funding scheme allowed It to
begin the execution of a real financial and economic program, *
^ji4« different from the former feverish, but unsystematized and
therefore seldom efficient, chase after sources of Immediate
revenue
.
One of the heairlest sources of deficit was disposed of by
leasing most of the railroads to private companies. In this In-
stance, as ne^arly everywhere with the exception of Germany, th
roads which were a heavy burden to the taxpayers while operated
by the frovernment
,
begaE9,ln many cases from the first year on,
a paying proposition In the hands of private concerns. A IC/fi
payment In gold was established for the custom duties, and the
whole system of taxation carefully revised. "Retrenchment" be-
came the watch-word of the Cxovernment , and It was practiced
with a fanatlsm which paid no attention to popular feelings
or open revolts, and did not stop at violent - often needless-
ly so - or even questionable measures. The situation was, how-
ever, desperate enough to Justify to a certain extent even ex-
treme measures.
The deficit In 1898 amounted to ^63.618 contos, or lo6fo of
the revenue, and there were 779.965 contos in circulation which
had to be raised to 300^ (I8d. ) of their current rate of ex-
efeanee

chfiHge (about 6 d. ).
Whatever could bear It, was taxed. Tobacco, llqudrs, matches^
salt, shoes, playing cards, vinegar, and even drugs had to brln^
their share Into the Treasury. The battleships under construct-
ion In England were sold, as well as the bonds received from the
Banco da Hepubllca under a formrr agreement (of May 18,1897).
Besides this, two special funds were created exclusively for
the regulation of the banKnote circulation: the first bore the
title "Fund for Kpdeeming the Paper Currency", and had the fol-
lowing sources of revenue assigned to it: the pfjyinents in banK-
notes on the leases of Federal railr<iads; payment>e by the debt-
ors of the State, including payments from banKs and the liqui-
dation of the bonus; income of the state from sources of an
accidental character, and budgetary surpluses. Notwithstanding
the uncertain character of its sources, the fund was a very
real thing, because, as was said above, by this time several of
the Federal railways were already leased, and gave promises of
a very substantial revenue to the state. The second fund was
called a Fund of Guarantee for the Paper Currency, and had as-
signed to it all payments in gold from the leases of Federal
railways, a part of the gold received in payment of custom du-
ties and taxes, and all other gold payiaents. This fund was to be
Kept in London, but the &overnment reserved for itself the right
through thr Banco da Kepublica and under certain restrictive
conditions, to withdraw from this fund up to 20.000 contos, if
that should be required to alleviate the tension of the money
market at home. The right of issuing banioiotes which has been
so largely and unfortunately used by the Government to help out
the banks, was abrogated, and a strict publicity of accounts

concerning: baaKnote Issues and Incineration was Introduced.
The methods adopted were in reality very simple, and embo-
died only the most elementary principles of financial and econo-
ml6 administration^ long before that time recognized and practi-
ced In the older countries of Europe and America, but the re-
sults were certainly good. The average rate of exchange rose in
1899 to 7. Id,; contos were withdrawn from circulation,
and, what was still more Important, Instead of the customary de-
ficit there was a surplus of 37.7^1 contos. The balance of trade
was also In favour of the country to the amount of 201.290 con-
tos. The system was however too new and too much at variance
with the habits which r>rown up In Hlo during previous admi-
nistrations when a clever and well connected man could always
hope to coax the State Treasury Into granting Its supports to
his schemes, however little they deserved It. The new system,
moreover, by raising the cost of living, caused some actual
hardships to the people, and tne often u!.'necessarlly violent
method of lis application was not llKely to reconcile to It the
public sentliflent. The ouposltlon resorted to every means: com-
mercial associations made to the G-overnment representations
couched in terms so violent that they could not be even accept-
ed for consideration; the opposlt lonary press both at home and
abroad vilified the Government, and passionately criticised
every one of its measures; there were even open revolts. But
there was a thing which gave to the Government more trouble than
all that the opposition could devise, and that was the banXing
crisis Of 1900, practically the last of the monsters created by
the old financial regime.
It was shown above how heavily watered was the stock of

the Banco da Reputollca do Bpasll, and now little actual capital
It had to worK with. As long, however, as the Government Print-
Ing House was there to supply It with hanKnotes ( frora January
1890 to February 1900 to help out the banJcs 260.M-55 contos were
Issued, and only 20.000 contos returned), the BanX could hold
Its own. The law of July 20, 1899 » has now prohibited any fur-
ther issues of hanXnotes for such purposes, and the banks began
Immediately to complain of a scarcity of currency. The Banco da
Republlca thought that It could manage Its affairs better 1ft If"
ws4i±e got rid of the official control which was then becoming
more and more troublesome. But as long as the BanK was In debt
to the Government there could be no question of any freedom
which In this instance meant really freedom to speculate on the
O-ffsr
rate of exchange. This was the origin of the subsequent^^oifi the
part of the BanX to settle its accounts with the Government, an
Offer which was very favourably accepted because, on one hand,
any cash was welcome to the Treasury at that moment, and, on the
other hand, the Government was aware of the real situation of •
the BanX, and was inclined to get what could be got before the
institution went down entirely. It was finally agreed that the
BanX would pay to the Government 50. 000 contos, 25«0<^0 at once,
and the rest In four quarterly Installments, while the Government
transferred to the BanX its claim on the Banco j-Upotecario. Sucii
an agreement could not help causing trouble since to withdraw
25.000 contos from an institution so slenderly provided with
worxing capital meant to enfeeble it for worx, and that again,
considering the prominent position of the Banco da Kepi;bllca In
the country, was equivalent to an enfeeblement of the whole
banXlng community of Klo. The Government tried at first to

counteract this tendency. In February 1900 It deposited In the
BanK 10.000 contos in short-term securities (Treasury drafts),
and made some of Its main branches depositaries of the surplus
of public revenues in the provinces; in June, when the money
market became tight again, it lent to the Banx L60O.OOO. But,
Instead of using this las^ sum for legitimate business, the Ban^
lost it In one month in a foolishly conducted speculation,
helped to maKe the rate of exchange dumP to in July, and
break down again to 9s- in August, and, notwithstanding the law
of IS99, clamoured for an issue of 50. 000 contos In banknotes
to help it out. The Government was willing to help the Bank in
other ways, but not by Issuing banknotes. The negotiations hung
for several days, and finally, on September 12, the Bank closed
its doors. The same was done on the same day by the banks Rural
e Hipotecario and Lavoura e coraraercio, while other Institutions
Of credit followed suit during the next few days. The G-overn-
ment this time was well prepared to meet the situation. Within
eight days from the formal beginning of the crisis the Law No.
689 was presented by the Government to the Houses of congress,
voted by Ihem, ana signed by the President. This law authorised
the Government to issue special 3^ apolices ( the so called in-
scrlp^loes ) to pay the debts of the Government, and to deposit
in the Bank LI. 000. 000 from the Fund for the Guarantee of Bank-
notes, and 25.000 contos in banknotes as a current account at
2^ Interest to be used for legitimate discount business exclu-
sively. The most Important part of the law, however, was that
which made such a help to the Bank conditioned upon the consent
Of the shareholders to prrjctically surrender to the Government

the whole business of managlnc: the banK until the time when all
Its deAts will he paid. The shareholders, having only the choice
between accepting the conditions or the CrOverBment or letting
the Bank go Into receivership, accepted the first on September
22, and five days later the creditors of the BanK formally ac-
cepted the offer of the Government to pay them the/Vclalms
In Inscrlp^loes . On October lo, 1900, a new law for the liqui-
dation of Insolvent banKs was passed, and promptly accepted by
all the banKs In the country. A few days later the Banco da La-
voura e commercio opened Its doors. A new era was beginning.
The average rate of exchange In I90I was already II. 36 d.
,
with a minimum of 9 23/32 d., and the amount of banKnotes In
circulation at the end of the year was only 680.^51 contos.
That this was not due to financial manipulations, but repre-
sented the result of a real development of the reslf^purces of
the country, was shown by the success of the railroad companies
and especially by the M-I2.473 contos in favour of the country
in its balance of trade. At the same time there were no more
Government drafts in circulation, and over L 3. 000. 000 in var-
ious deposits in London.
The following table may be of interest:
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The period 1902 -I906 was devoted to quiet and methodical
constructive worX of a character highly heneflclal to the count-
ry. The Crovernment of Mr. Hodrlgues Alves, former Minister of
Finance, saw that It was not the absolute amount of banXnotes
In circulation that caused trouble, but Its excess In relation
to what was required to carry on the business of the country.
Instead, therefore, of crippling the productive powers of the
country by forcing the circulation down to the level of the re-
quirements of the commerce, the new Government endeavoured to
build the country up to the circulation. All the fieavy work was
by that time done by the Cabinet of Mr. Oampo Salles, and Mr.
Alves had no more need to use the harsh methods fi'f the preced-
ing" administration, which allowed him to solve some of the most
delicate and Important problems, especially in connection with
the financial relations of the States to the Central Government
The events of the preceding years have done much to draw ^
the trade away from the port of Klo which ought to remain the
coramerclal c^nife as much for commercial, as for political rea-
sons. The new administration succeded in mftKlng a loan In Lon-
don of L S. 500. 000 (L5. 500. 000 at 90/p, the rest at 97fo ) , and de-
voted It to the reconstruction of the port. At the same time
the municipality worked hard to put the city in good shape, and
not only succeeded In making it one of the most beautiful cltlei
of south America, but got rid of the yellow fevers which made
the sojourn there so dangerous. Much was also done to abolish
the numerous Internal custom duties which very seriously ham-
pered tne development of Internal trade, but could not be touch-
ed before without^ ihe Jalousies of the various Federated States,
The part of the custom duties paid In gold was raised from 257^
to 35^/0 in some Instances, 50^ in others
.

The reconstruction of tne Banco da Republlca^ based on the deve-
IppiPxent of legitimate business/was carried out so successfully
that the 3anK became one of the strongholds against various
attacKs of local and foreign speculation on the rate of exchange.
The i^ind for the Guarantee of BanKnotes rose from L 2.592.566
at tne end of 1902 to L 8. 131.887 at the end of I906. The Re-
demption Fund rose during the same time from 8.535 contos to
20.875 contos. The quotations on Brazilian securities showed
how favourably the investing public viewed the situation: the
apollces and the ^"h foreign loans were at par or even slight-
ly above it, wnlle the Funding aoails were quoted at Io6. This
was all tne more significant because the maricet In I90M- - 6
had no lacK of material to offer to the investing public, and
the securities of the Russian and Japanese Governments, as well
as tnese required for the mighty development of Industries in
united states and Germany offered an unusually varied and at-
tractive choice to the Investors. In view of tnis the slow de-
velopment Of the i'tind for tne Redemption of BanKnotes is ex-
tremely significant in showing that tne Government believed not
in reducing the number of banknotes, but in building under them
a solid foundation in the form Qf a large gold guarantee fund
and, especially, a healthy development of the productive forces
of the country. The following table ( taKen from Calogeras , p.3?sj
shows that it was Justified in its policy.

year Rate of
C
12%!. 776- ^67
261- 773
/€ %4 7SS670 3oo. J^S
The growtii of the imports in tnis table snovfs that the Inaust
rial equipment of the country was slowly hut steadily improving,
a fact which is also inaicated by the increase in the volurtie of
traffic and mileage growth of the railroad system ( from 15.68O
Kms. inI902 to 17-242 in 1906).
In all this brilliant situation there was, however, one darK
point which soon made itself felt?: troubles on the coffee mar-
Ket. The trouble of the produce "rs of coffee was mainly this.
The lands were for the most ^ttflfi bought at an excessive price,
and tne development of the plantations carried on on borrowed
money. A coffee plantation represents a heavy investment, and
cannot be turned to another sort of culture without the loss of
practically the whole investment. At the same time coffee is not
a commodity l^hat the marKet can absorb indefinitely. An overpro-
duction and a fall of prices were bound to occur, and did as ^ji
early as 1897, i3ut for some time the consequences did not troubU
the producers as much as they ought to owing to the fact that
all tile debts and expenses were in paper money, and, while the

price - In gold - fell on the European marKets, the rate of ex-
change fell also, and the Brazilian fazendelro got enough banK-
notes, however depreciated, to carry on his business. But in
1906-7 the, production of coffee reached the mhxlmim of 20.2 mlli^.
sacKs, while the average rate of exchange was above I5 d., and
the whole business of coffee production saw banKruptcy looKing
In its face. The state of Sao Paulo in which the culture of
coffee was by far the most important industry, tooK the lead in
the matter, intriJduced a special tax ©f 2SI on each alqueiro of
new land planted by coffee trees, and, by cleverly manipulating
the public opinion, persuaded tne Federal G-overnment to pledge
its support to a G-overnmental regulation of the industry. More-
over, it induced the two other States most interested in Keeping
up the prices of coffee (Rio and Mlnas Geraes ) to join it in an
agreement Known as the "Convenio de Taubate". By this agreement
the states proposed to maintain the price of coffee, type 7 New
YorK, at 55 to 65 francs per sacK of 60 Kgs., and to raise it
to 70 francs If convenient; to prevent the exportation of infe-
rior Kinds, and to detielop their consumption in the country; to
standarize the article, and to create Coffe Exchanges and Oham-
bcrs of Commerce of Coffee, to limit over-production by means of
a restrictive taxation. To obtain the funds necessary for the
carrying out of this plan a loan of LI5.OOO.OOO was to be made
by the State of Sao Paulo, guaranteed if necessary by the Feder-
al Government, and in order to prevent oscillations of the prlc€
(in paper money) of this loan, the amount obtained by it was to
form the depositary capital of a Caja de Conversion to be creat-
ed by the Federal Government. This agreement, in a modified
form, was, after some opposition, approved by the Federal Con-

gress on August 6, 1906.
In this Instance the Brazilian Government made a mlstaKe
which It was not the first to maKe. Prices of commodities can-
not be regulated Dy law, and the machinery of a government Is
not adapted for erjgaglng In price manipulations on tne Interna-
tional market. Such was also the opinion of the banKlng coiamunl-
ty In Europe, and, when the Federal Government tried. In Janua-
ry 1907, to Obtain a loan for this purpose, the London bankers
replied that they cannot lend their name and responsibility to
a maneuver of so hazardous a speculation condemned by the flnan-
clal and commercial circles of the whole world. It seems, how-
ever, that the moral scruples of the world's banking community
could be rather easily overcome, since during the next year
L 11.000.000 were placed on various European markets, of which
L 5.000.000 were Issued in London, and the State of Sao Paulo,
with the approval and active support of the Federal Government,
was enabled to go on with Its "hazardous speculation" of the so
called valorisation of coffee.
It was mentioned above that the real difficulties in the
coffee production began when the rate or exchange went up. As a
fi= matter of fact, the whole country suffered from the instabili-
ty of the rate of exchange which Inevitably lntrd>duced a dange-
rous and highly undesirable element of speculation into the mos^
legitimate branches ^of business. But the coffee producers were
practically the only class which could gain by tne low rate of
exchange, and were losing at the high rate. To understand this.
It must be remembered that although on the whole the rate of
wages tends to adjust Itself to the cost of living (which in a
country like Brazil depends largely upon the price of imported

commodities, and this price Is In Its turn a function of the
rate of exchange), still the wages are apt to fall more rapid-
ly than to rise, and, as a rule, do not rise as fast as the
cost of living rises, and the rate of exchange falls. Now, as
was pointed out by the jornal de commerclo In 1907, I. 000 sacKs
of coffee, at 60 francs per sacK, will bring in Brazilian cur-
rency the following suiqs:
at 18 d 31:797^^
15 d 38:1^6$
12 d ^7:697$
If the wages be 10:0000, then the results for the worKman
and fazendelro In gold mllrels will be as follows:
worKman : fazendelro :
at I8d 6:660
at 15 d 5:555 I5:6i^3
at 12 d I6:75»^
Or, by a change of the rate of exchange from IS to 12 pence^
the worKman loses 2:222, and the employer gains practically the
same amount. This little calculation was necessary to show the
interests which were really protected by the new financial ven-
ture. What was desired was to bring the rate of exchange to I5
pence, maKe such arrangements that it would not go above that fi-
gure, and KGL trust to lucK - or ill lucK, since the original
project was to fix the rate at only 12 pence - that it will not
go below it; the Caja de Conversion answered all these purposes.
This institution was to receive Brazilian gold coins, lire,
marKs, francs, dollars, and British sovereigns, and issue in
exchange special banKnotes of which the value was fixed at I5
d. per mllrels, such banKnotes payable at sight in gold at the

sane rate; no banKnote redeemed by the Caja. was to be issued
again (in imitation of the practice of tne BanK of Rngl^^nd).
The issue of the Caja could not in any case exceed 32O.OOO con-
tos (corresponding to a gold deposit of L 20.000,000). In other
j
words the Caja intended to do what the BanK of Amsterdam and
John Law did in the seventeenth century, with the important dif-
ference, however, that in this instance the Government delibe-
rately tried to bring down the value of its own banknotes in
the interefcfis of a powerful minority, and at tne expense of an
overwhelming majority of the population.
The creation of tne CaJa de Conversion had as one of its
results the appearance in the country of two Kinds of currency
at the same time: a convertible currency consisting of the banK-
notes of the CaJa, or really gold certificates, and QW incon-
vertible currency giioranteed by a large and growing gold fimd,
gradually diminishing through the operation of another fimd
(for the Redemption of BanKnotes), strictly limited in amount for
the future by the laws of 1899, and relying for its valuation
on the requirements of the circulation of an Imensely rich
country which was little ly little arranging its financial and
economic conditions so as to insure for Itself the development
to which it was amply entitled. The inconvertible currency
could rise in price both legally and by the action of live eco-
nomic forces, and it did so, although its rise was of course
hampered by the banKnotes of the CaJa: at the beginning of I9I0
the rate of exchange was about I6d. This had several rather un-
expected coiisequences. It afforded a possibility to maKe good
profits by importing gold specie, selling it to the CaJa at the
rate of I5d., or l6^ per sovereign, and then b uylng drafts for

the sanie sovereigns at I5#. A debt could be also paid In two
ways, both aiDparently legal, but If paid In one way, I00« could
buy L6-I3-if, and 11' paid In another way - only L 6-5-O. Finally
the situation becarae so tnreatenlng tnat the Government had to
present to the Congress a law raising the rate of exchange of
the banknotes of the Ca^ja to I6d., but, as far as the present
writer Is aware, this law has not , been accepted.
The Brazilian currency presents a peculiar phenomenon in
that, contrary Ifo the ordinary practice, the efforts of the Go-
vernment arc directed not </n bringing it to its legal par value
and Keeping it there, but preventing it from reaching the
rate of exchange to whlcn it is entitled by the wealth and eco-
nomic conditions of the country, and the state of the gold fund
behind the banknotes. It is to be hoped tnat the growth of the
rubber industry which does not depend on a low rate of exchange
for its prosperity, and tne general spread of healthy economic
and political doctrines in the country will lead to a more nor-
mal monetary legislation, and thl ^^s seems to be the only thing
that the country at the present moment wants in order to estab-
lish, within a comparatively short tirae, a strong gold banknote
currency, aisi such a currency ts now^ the conditio sine qua non
of a healthy and systematic growth of national wealth, espeeial
ly in a new country which depends for the rapid development of
its ressources on the use of cheap foreign capital.

CHILE_»
Chile has inherited Its monetary troubles from the days of the
Spanish regime. In 1895, however, the Government considered the
situation as if^\fiSLtmrile to^resurapf;;iJ^gold circulation, and estaD-
llshed, W the law of February 11,1895. a rate of exchange of
18 gold pence for a paper peso ( or a peso of 0.599103 gr.
of gold). The total circulation at this time siQOunted to #59.
500.000. TO maintain this rate of exchange was hy no means easy.
Economic conditions In 1895 were very bad, many bt^nKs riaTof
failed or were on the eve of falling, prices of real estate v/cre
going down, and commerce disorganised. But as long as the poll-
tlcal situation was satisfactory, the Government managed to
maintain the rate of exchange close to par. When, however, in
1897 there arose international complications, especially with
Argentine, one of the members of the Congress found that he
could In "two words" descvibe the state of affairs:" the si-
tuation was such as to cause anguish, and the principal cause
for It was lack of confidence In the continuation of the exist-
ing monetary system" (Congressman Mac-lver In the sitting of
July 27, 1897). very little was, or Indeed could have been,
done to give things a brighter aspect. The economic situation
grew worse and worse, and finally, on June 23, 1898, the Mi-
nister Of Finance had to ask the Chamber to consider the mone-
tary question in a secret session. As could well^bf^e^predicted,
this was the beginning of the end. The secret was out 111 pre-
*
served, and enough became known to scare the public, especial-
ly in Santiago, into a run on the banks for their gold. The

secret session of the Chamber found that the "Argentine quest-
ion was seriously alarming", and authorised the Government to
spend L 500.000 on war preparations, - a decision which was
hardly llKely to restore public confidence in monetary matters-
and on July 6 the banKs in Santiago asKed for a permission to
close their doors until July II. Such a permihssion was readily
granted, and, further, a law was published giving the banks a
"moratorium" of thirty days during which the rrovernment was to
consider the monetary situation. This consideration resulted
in the issue of 15 0.000. 000/;f5^ in banxnotes^whlch were made
legal means of payment. It was promised at the same time that
the metallc circulation wdaWbe resumed on January I, 1902.
This, however, was the worst moment of the whole period.
In the second part of the year treaties with Peru and Bolivia
were signed, and it appeared very soon that the danger of a war
with Argentine was very much exggerated. The foreign trade was
growing, and in four years (1898 - I90I ) gave a balance in fa-
vour of the country of 19^.000.000 pesos (in pesos of 18 d. ).
It must be also remembered that the considerable amount of
gold which was drawn out of the banks during the panic of July
1898 belonged for the most part to residents of the country,
and did not go abroad, but was simply hoarded by them ( o-.suber-
caseaux, In Revlsta de Derecho e Jurisprudencla , 190^^-). There
were therefore no economic reaso$ns to cause a permanent fall
of the rate of exchange, and if it did do so temporarily, it
was mainly owing to fear of an Increase of the amount of paper
money in circulation. Thus, when In January 1899 a project of
a law providing for a large Increase in the issue of banknotes
was presented to the Chambers, it brought the rate of exchange

considerably down (average rates In gold pence: 1898 - 15
1899 - Ik 9/16, 1900 - 16 7/16), although the motion was opposeaf'
XiV the Government and finally defeated. But whenever the politi-
cal situation outside, and the politicians Inside, left the mo-
ney marlcet alone. It rapidly recovered as far as It could, and,
e,ff. In the beginning of 1901 the rate of exchange reached I7d.
In other words, the circulation accepted the ^^50.000.000 thrown
Into It In 1898 at a cours force", and nearly brought them up
to the legal par value. The trouble was, however, that there
were always some powers beWnd the scenes of national life which
did not let the marXet alone. The Chamber developed a habit of
holding secret sessions which made the public believe that a
rupture with Argentine was close at hand; from time to time
thert- happened things insignificant in themselves (as, e.g., the
appearance of some Argentine policemen in the^ province of Ulti-
ma Esperanza), but which, in the hands of politicians and some
newspaper men, helped to Keep alive the lacK of confidence in
the stability of peace, even after the two governments confirm-
ed their desire to avoid war by the agreement of December 25
»
1901. It cannot be denied, though, that the public had some
reaeon to have its own opinion as to the peaceful intentions of
their governiaents , because, Just about or a little after the time
of the agreement, the Argentine G-overnraent bought two ironclads
in Italy, and the Chilean Government ordered the same number -ef^
in England. As a result, the rate of exchange began to
fall again, and in December I90I reached the minimum of I3¥d.
Under these circumstances it was natural to put off until
January I, 1905, the resumption of the payments in gold which,
according to the law of July 1898, was to taKe place on January

1,1902,, and Senator Matte expressed the views of the conserva-
tive business elements of the country when he said that he 'is
not afraid to put off until 1905 that which, if under taKen in
1902, would be the ruin of a great and beneficial idea, and an
enormous injury to the solid and permanent credit of the Repub-
lic" .
This act of the G-overnment was often criticized later on (e.
g. by Julio Zegers in his Estudlos Economicos, p. l65ff . ) on
the ground that the danger of war with Argentine was exaggerates^
and that Argentine would never- darec/io declare war while the
feiss. Argentine -Chilean controversy was under the consideration
of the King of Great Britain as an 'arbiter. All that proved to
be correct, but it is very doubtful whether the certainty of
peace was strong enough in 1902 to allow the Government to taKe
a step of such importance as the resumption of gold currency, a
Step which^m the best case^ woula^\^r4(«^^out little real advan-
tage (since in quiet periws the exchan^-e was very near par even
as things were then), and might, if things went wrong, have^ve-
ry disastrous consequences, an^ resuiuyin a loss by the country
of large sums of gold. As a matter of fact, the military expen-
ses during I90I and 1902 amounted to # 20.000.000, and this sum
was taKen from the fund destined to redeem the banKnotes in
circulation. The economic^of the country was, however, very
good, and so was its foreign trade, as shown by the following
table
:

In million pesos of 18 d.
Years: Imports: Exports: Balance:
1902... 132.^ 185.8 53.^
1903.. 1^2. 1^- 191^-. 3 51.9
19011... 157.2 215.9 58.7
Total ^32.0 596.0 I6i|.0
In Antafogasta, Taltal, Aguas Blancas were discovered new depo-
sits Of salpetre, and what was considered to be an arid desert
proved to be a source of wealth to the State, and a great help
to the growth of the gold fund of the country. In the south,
near the straits of Magellan, and still more In the North, on
the Argentine frontier, vast, until then unexplored prairies
were found to be very convenient for fe^ raising ^ cattle and
horses, while in the primeval forests of the continental re-
glons me Islands of the Archipelago began to develop a prorai-
sing lumber industry. And, as was to be expected, the rate of
exchange gradually rose to 17 d. More even, there was distinct-
ly felt a scarcity in media of circulation. The law of Decem-
ber 1901 provided that payments in gold should be resumed on
January 1905, and there were many who considered that it
ought to be done, but the aovernment , recognizing the economic
progress of the country, still considered that the large mili-
tary expenses of the preeedlng year have made such a hole in
the conversion fund that it would be unwise to resume the gold
payments at that particular moment. Instead of this the Govern-
ment found it more convenient to increase the fiduciary circu-
lation by a new Issue of I 25. 000. 000, and by guaranteeing in
full the new banKnotes. This project met in the Chamber with m

opposition, tne most important arguraent agulnst the new issue
being tnat the country did not want any Increase in the media of
circulation. The following table ( taKen from Sutoercaseaux , El
Papel-Moneda en Chile, p. 15) shows however that the turnover of
money increased very considerably; this table gives the move-
ment of banKing capitals and business according to the figures
of the Officina Central de Estatisdica:
in million pesos
:
Year
:
Paid-up capital: REserve
funds I
Deposits
:
Loans
:
190I. .
.
M-2.I 9i|.6 106.7
1902 . . 5.1 IM-I.3 173.
1
1903.
.
•
136.2 162.8
190k, .
.
65.3 8.6 171. 201.6
1905 76.0 II.
I
29^.1 296.9
It must be, ilirther, taKen into account that during this pe-
riod the Chilean industry expanded not only in volume, but also
geographically. Business, as was mentioned above, was carried
into new parts of the country, and large sums were paid out in
wages to a population which was not yet civilised enough to maicc
use of bcnKs even had they existed in tnose latitudes, which
often was not the case. There was therefore certainly a consi-
derable drain on the monetary res^ources of the centers, and it
is very llKely that the existint; amount of banKnotes was often
felt to be inadequate to the new demands of the circulation.
That it was by no means excessive even three years previously
Is partly shown by the rate of exchange of I7d. which the peso
reached in I90I , and which it could not h^ve reached if the mar

Ket were at that time weighed down by an excess of ban^otes In
circulation.
The law Of December 29, 190^+, postponed until January I, I9I<^
the formal resumption of the gold circulation, and Allowed a new
issue of ??30.000.000 in banKnotes. It also provided for the for-
mation Of a conversion Fund to which the following sums were as-
signed: the 8^23. 000. 000 (in gold pesos of I8d. ) then deposited
m the Treasury; the ? 15.000.000 (gold pesos of I8d. ) obtaineaj'
through the sale of the ironclads Const itutipn and Llbertad; the
3^5.000.000 (gold pesos Of 18 d. ) a month from Custom House reve-
nues, and all revenues from the sale of salpetre lands and land5
in the Magellan Territory. The last two sources were to be used
only until the time of the fund reaching the value of ^80.000.
000
,
equivalent to the amount of banKnotes in circulation. The
fund was to be Kept in first class banKs in Europe, and to be
transferred to Chile, for stamping it into local coins, prior to
the resumption of payments in gold.
Thl8 statement of the law shows that the conversion Fund
was started with ^ ^8.000.000 gold pesos, or 60^ of the nominal
amount of the banKnotes in circulation which, considering the
volume of the business done in the country, was even at that time
nearly sufficient to resume payments in gold. There must there-
fore have been some reason why the Government did not venture
to do it at once. This time the reason could not be fear of a
war with Argentine or somebody else. The Kusso-Japanese war
was approaching, and It was evident that no small powers would
be allowed to cause any disturbances in the diplomatic relations
quite sufficiently complicated by the Important problems more
or less unexpetedly originated in the Far East. Later events

have shown that it was the very rapidity of the growth of busi-
ness, or rather the underlying element of Inriatlonlst specu-
lation^ which prompted the Government to sin W cautiousness, If
sin there oe. . The following table taKen from official ststlstlcj
gives an Idea of the growth of speculation, because, although
formally It is a statistical account of new incorporations, act-
ually It represents for the most part Aiflrs created for the ex-
clusive purpose of providing material for stock exchange ope-
rations .
Year: capital of new incorporations:
L sterling: Pesos mills.
1900.. 230.000 23-9
I90I.. 1^75.000 13.9
1902.. ^-0.900 10.9
1903.. 20. IV
190^.. 995.000 58.5
1905.. 5.7^1.2^0 113 .3
This could not, of course, last long, and in 190^ a breaK in
the marKet occured which, although ii had no really disastrous
effects on the development of the national industries, forced
many speculators off the sc^m^^A- It brought also a serious
dearth of the media of speculi^tion , because the banks which had ,
large sums tied up in capltui credits, securities, and European
deposits, were in danger of being unable to meet their obligatlOf»,i
in Chilean banknotes. The Government wanted to meet the diffi-
culty by creating a Cad a cie Conversion which would issue bank-
notes having a legal value in exchange for gold, but the Congrei^
did not like the idea, and after some disagreement first with
the Governiaent, and then betv/een the Upper and Lower Houses,

passed the l&w of May 23, I906, toy which ttiCe aovernment was
authorised to iisue iiO.OOO.OOO pesos In banKnotes of which twen-
ty millions were to be used for military purposes, and for the
construction of waterworKs in various cities, and a railroad
from Arlca to La Paz. This part of the issue was to be guaran-
teed in full (i.e. in pesos of I8d.), the guarantee to be ob-
tained from loans (L 3. TOO. 000) which the Governin<?nt was autho-
rised to maKe for these purposes. The remaining twenty millions
were to be K^tiTto banKs and private individuals who could se-
cure the loan by deposits of gold or gold drafts on London.
The issue of the J+0.000.000 pesos improved the situation consi-
de^rbly, and, moreover, the mrKet viewed very favourably the
election to the Presidency of senor Montt who was known to be
in favour of economical admin is tr^4i ion and of a return - at the
first opportunity - to payments in gold, under these circum-
stances the earthquake of August I906 was a peculiarly hard bloy/
the country, and immediately affected the rate of exchange
which m October and November was at d., aud^ gradually fell
to II d. in April 1907. It was not however, the earthquake alone
which produced such a fall of the rate of exch&nge. The earth-
quake rather only brought out all the weak points in the situ-
ation which hAXsi already once, about a year before, produced
a small panic on the market. As a result of all this, the out-
look in 1907 was far from encouraging. All new enterprlzes
fell into total discredit, the price of stocks went down, and
a/nountr
the public was horrified at the of the expenses required
to restore what was wrecked by the earthquake. The newspapers
vigorously attacked the Government, and made all sorts of radi-

cal proposals: to stop turning Into the Conversion Fund the golci^
assigned to It; to suspend the law requiring that costom duties
be paid in gold; to raise the custom duties on all Imports ex-
cept articles of prime necessity; to taKe from Europe the con-
version Fund and to load It to the local banKs, etc. Thl»i agi-
tation of the press Is mentioned here because It Is one of the
great dangers In the Latin American Republics as far as moneta-
ry matters are concerned. The public there Is too easily excited
and is sometimes ready to see the beginning of the end of the
world in the failure of a couple of banKs of quite secondary
importance. A "public opinion" is created in a moment, and if
the persons at the helm of affairs have reasons to be inclined
to follow it, they can easily let themselves be forced to take
sttps which they would probably never venture to propose on
their own responsibility.
This Is what practically happened, at least to a certain
extent, in this Instance. Jne Presidential message explained
that the general financial situation was satisfactory; that
eleven millions were spent in connection with the earthquake,
and that it was proposed to spend ten more millions for the
equipment of the railroads; that the economic situation of the
country was taut (tlrante), and that this tension and the depre-
ciation of the paper money created considerable difficulties for
most of the citizens. At the same time the Minister of the In-
terior informed the congress that the conversion Fund was expec-
ted to reach in December the high mark of $75-000.000 gold.
As usual, several projects were presented to the Charabers
embodying the well known features of south American finance,
among them a Caja de Emision which would laKe charge of the

Issue of t)&nlcnote8. Me&nwhlle the rate of exchange went always
down (on Deceratier 7, I.e. after the publication of the law of
which we are going to speaK presently, it reached the minimum
of 8 3/16 d.), and finally the law of August 27,1907, was
adopted which made the following provisions: to issue within
thirty days thirty million pesos in banKnotes, and to convert
this sum Into bonds of the Caja de Credlto Hipotecarlo at a price
not above par; to stop sending abroad the funds assigned for
the conversion of paper money as long as the rate of exchange
is below I7d.; to contract u loan abroad for a sum not exceed-
ing L i^-. 500. 000 actual, at 5^ maximum interest and 1^ cumula-
tive amortisation, destined exclusively for the guarantee of
paper money, and a further loan of L 3. 000. 000 on the same ge-
neral conditions for vj^rious public worKs in the country; to
create a Caja de credlto Hipotecarlo for loans on real estate,
and a CaJa de Credlto salitrero for loans on salpetre-bearlng
properties, both institutions to issue gold bonds.
Ve see thus that fromI90I to 1908 the banKnotes circulat-
ion was increased from ^50.000.000 to $110,000,000, and that
finally even the strict provisions of former laws with regard
to the forma tiion of a conversion Fund haW been dispensed with.
During the same time there were discovered In the country vast
new sources of national wealth, but the economic situation was
still certainly worse in 1908 than it had been in 190k, The pro-
spects of a war have been steadily becoming less threatening,
but military expenses have not decreased, and budgetary defi-
cits, as well as deficits in the administration or railroad?;,
have become chronic. This is the regular picture of a nevf countty^

richly endowed by nature
^
o(iMain>^y which Is as yet In a stage of
transition, and has not yet worKed out an econoraic and flnan-
cial system adapted to the requirements oi" ile^lll'e. It must
not, however, toe forgotten that Chile is in some respects in a
peculiarly advantageous situation as far ae its monetary system
Is concerned: it has a large Conversion Fund in gold; it has
a fairly good banking system without the banKs being allowed to
Issue banXnotes; above all, It has a natural monopoly of sal-
petre, a product for which there is a good demand on the part
of the richest countries in the world, which are thus ready to
supply Chile with gold in exchange for this liaportant factor
in the development of chemlcw.1 industries and agriculture.
What the country /viiBCij more than anything^ Is a good, honest, an
efficient administration, and some guarantee that it will be
dragged neither into a war, nor into a new speculation of in-
flation. Given these conditions, there is no reason why Chile
should not be able to build up a m.onetary system at least as
good as that of Oriental Uruguay.

AHGENTINA.
The revolution of July IS90 was practically the end of the
old regime In Argentine, lhat may be called the first construc-
tive period ended T?ie days of political gunplay were now over,
and a new system of national life toegan to grow up on the de'nrlJ
of the old system. The first days of the new period were extreme
ly hard. "The pendulum of the life of the great commercial and
economic mechanism stopped. There was no money to conceal, neith-
er credit nor confluence. Nobody bought, and nobody could sell
even at e low price. There was no worK, and the horrors of rea-
lity were made worse by the fantastic creations of imaginations
weakened by fear" (Jose A.Terry, Contrlbuclon , p.29. ). But, hap-
pily for the country, "it had a GOd of Its own" (lb. P.30), and
gradually the situation became less and less terrible, so that
by 189k the Government was able to turn from the Immediate pre-
sent to the future, and lay down somethinj llKe a program for
the second stage of the economic evolution of the country. This
year will be the starting point for our study oS the monetary
situation in the argentine Republic.
In 1894 the population of the Republic was only M-.^mllls.,
or 1.6 Inhabitants per square kilometer, but the economic deve-
lopment of the country hao/ grown considerably even during the
preceding turbulent decade: the cultivated area increased 300^^,
horned cattle 57^^, production of sugar SOO^/o, production of wine
127^, etc. During the same period more than 10.000 K llometers
of new railroads were put into operation, and freight traffic
Increased from 4.1^+ to 6.36 mills, tons. Nevertheless, the coun
try had an enormous debt, an inconvertible currency, and a very

poor credit, wnich showed that If the economic development of
the country was healthy, the same could not be said of Its fi-
nancial system. This Is what the Executive had to say to the
Congress (Report for 189^, P.IO) about the Inconverslon of I885:
"The causes that brought on the Inconverslon In I885 are well
Known; they, at the time , operated efficiently and they have con-
tinued to do so during the last eight years, entangled as they
have been in the networK of confusion In facts and ideas that
constitutes the history of the economic crisis that still in-
cumbers this country. The causes were: The deficits or uneipen-
ness Of the budgets; The immoderate Increase of the consolidat-
ed and Floating Debts; The inequality of our Coromercial Balance.
The pressing demands made by Foreign Capital; The wan/t of stabt
llty in our political action."
The following table is compiled to show the relative weight
of the above mentioned factors:
From I8S& to I8SM- I885 to I89»+
mills. pesos.
Deficits 79.5 17^.8
#
Increase of consolidated 28.1 356.
debt
##
Balance of foreign trade -32. -153.O
The most significant figures in these tables are probably
those which refer to the balance of tnade. Only a country llKe
France, Italy, or England can afford to have a negative balance
of trf.de, because In the case of Italy the money spent in it by
foreign tourists offsets the loss In the balance of tirade as
#From 1882 to 188^^-. ## From I885 to 1892.

shown by the movement of merchandlEe across the frontier. In
Great Britain tne same Is done by the returns of the world-wide
maritime transportation trade, ana enormous Investments oi' Bri-
tish capital abroad, while France helps out its general balance
both by what foreigners spend in the country, and what French
Investments draw from abroad. Argentine possessea iW-OW*©' of
th€s« sources of revenue, and had to fill up the gaps made by un-
favourable balances by loans and by attracting foreign capital
Into the country for various investments ( in 189^ about a billi-
on pesos were invested in Argentine).
The above figures show not only the causes which brought
about the inconversion of 1885, but also the fact that the same
causes were at least as much, if not more, active in 189^ as
they were ten years before. There were, moreover, two more
causes which helped the currency to remain inconvertible, and
these were: the b&nXing situation, and the state of the currenc\j
Itself.
The banKs were governed by the law of November 3, 1887, Known
as the Guaranteed National BanKs Act. The foundation of bfmKs
was declared free to all, and the banKs were authorised to issue
up to 90/o of their effective capital in banknotes guaranteed by
State securities. The mechanism of the issue v/as simple: the
National Government Issued securities at U-^/o which the banks
bought at 85^/5 (in gol-d), and exchanged them at the Ca.-5a de
Conversion for lQO}'o in inconvertible banknotes. Here is what
it
the Executive of the Republic had to say about^ after six years
Of the working of the Act (Report for 189^, P.18):
"The Guaranteed National BanKs Act proved the direct and

crowning camse of the outburst of the crisis; the application
of the Act hastened its development, and then came the revuls-
ion of 1890 and I89I coupled with the July revolution and the
failure of the Official and some of the Guaranteed Banks.
The Act, which at the outset was endorsed by the public,
comprised, at the same time, vital drawbacks that tended fatal-
ly to the tight grasp of banking officialism throughout the Ke-
public and to the establishment of air-built banKs , a creation
Of the Governments of the Provinces, with a loaned capital and
warranted by gold securities issued by the Federal Government.
Yes, the Act was at cross purposes with the interests of the
country
:
1st Because its basis consisted in the creation of public
funds in gold , to be issued by the General Government in the
very midst of inconverslon;
2nd Because the gold that those Public Funds ought to pro-
duce in some cases, in the form of loans guaranteed by the funds
themselves, was at the disposal of the General Government, when
a crisis was betraying Itself, and when everything tended to
show that the gold in question could not be appropriated to the
ends specified by the Act;
3rd Because it tended towards the issue of an inconvertible
paper currency wltn the guarantee of a Government which was on
the ^Obd to insolvency;
M-th Because it tended towards the establishment of Offi-
cial Banks in inadeq ate commercial centres, inasmuch as the
greater part of the provinces are not suited to the establish-
ment Of banks with a large capital, and Inasmuch as private ca-
pital would not be invested in any scheme of the kind, by rea-
nnr> of ttia unimportance of tha maTtkftt in Qu wnt.lon. r.n thfiit. Ihf.

Guaranteed BanKs Act induced perforce the multiplication of
Official Provincial Government BanKs, that had no means of re-
venue of their own nor any appropriate raarKets wherewith to sus
tain their establishments, such was the practical result of
such an enactment".
During the great crisis of I89I, on the ruins of the two
graet official "banKs ( the Provd)ncial BanK and the National Banlc)
was created the Banlc of the Argentine Nation. According to its
Statutes, it was a shareholders' banK, with a capital of fifty
million dollars currency, but the situation was so desperate
that the BanK did not wait? for the capital to be subscribed, an^
began to worK at once with a provisional Board of Directors
appointed by the Executive, "^nd fifty million dollars of capi-
tal borrowed from the Caja de conversion. This BanK which later
became, and continues to be, one of the most important and effi"
clent factors in the ecoiiOnlc progress of the country, could,
however, do but little during the fir-^st years of its existence.
The state of the currency was partly shown above. The totat
issue in 189^ was only ^?296 .693 -628 , » sum in itself rather
large for a country with a comparatively ?Tr^ Sp^Of^ie poputat-
lon, and an Industry in the stage of producing mainly raw pro-
ducts. It appears, however, to be absolutely excessive when we
consider that part of it was guaranteed by real estate, part was
not guaranteed at all, and ^ 139.991.529, the best guaranteed
part of the circulation, had behind them only public funds.
The currency was thus not only inconvertible: It actually had
no metallic foundation at all.
The Ca^ja de Conversion, created in October 1890, was intend-
ed to taKe charge of the Issues and conversion of national cur-

rency, and to looX after the due application of monetary legis-
lation. We do not find, however, any proofs thnt Its activity
during the first years of its existence had any Influence on
the course of events on the money marXet.
The program for the future was expressed by the executive 1*^
IS914- m the following words ( Keport for 189^, P.I7)^
•The Executive holds agio to iDe a grfcive , a very grave evil
the
for the country, owing to^violent oscillations It gives rise to,
but it also holds It to be a peculiarity of all Inconverslon
and of the nervous state of a people that has been uniformly
threatened with political turmoil. Agio Is not to be assailed
by a set of regulations nor by prohibitory measures. On the con-
trary, free action, as It exists at present, and the security
that the Government will not become a StocK Exchange speculator
are means of defence against stocK-jobblng manoeuvres. Agio is
nurtured by our political comraotlons and commercial invalidat-
ion. Political quiet, and comraerclal vitality and industry will
put our paper on a sounder footing by consequence of fewer
fluctuations. The formula: "to consume a great deal and to pro-
duce still more", if put In practice, will give rise to a great-
er International metallic anlm.atlon In our marXets; and a per-
manent and active play of a supply and demand for specie, will
to a certain degree curb agio".
The next pages will show in how far this very sound prog-
ram was carried out in actual practice.
The adialnistratlon of President Uriburu which was called
upon to act upon this program was fortunate enough to find the
country in a state of comparative quiet. The recent defeat of

cthe revolutionary party, the revulsion of feelings after the
feverish exsltement of the preceding years, the poverty of the
people, and the possibility of International complications
made the Internal government of the country comparatively easy.
This was taKen advantage of to solve the most Important finan-
cial prohlems, viz. those of the provincial debts, G-ualfanteed
BanKs , and railroad guarantees.
Whether the provinces had a right to contract loans seems
to be a debatable question In Argentine litterature, but in
IS95 there were on the marKet such loans to an amount of 137.
261.850 gold pesos, distributed among the provinces as follows:
Gold pesos
:
Mendoza. .
.
5.888.596
San Luis . .
.
888.208
Catamarca . .
.
5.093.^32
San Juan 2.169.398
Oorrlentes . .
.
6. 411.290
Buejios Aires . .
.
52 .789.296
Tucuman . .
.
2 .962.008
Cordoba .... 23.Si3.722
Santa Fe . . .
.
21.956.603
Entre Rlos . .
.
17.289.306
None of these provinces was able to pay the interest and
amortisation of these bonds, and the disrepute into which the
provincial securities haW fallen, very In^jurlously affected
the national credit, i-^ecause European bondholders and even
stdicKv exchanges made no distinction between provincial and na-
tional bonds ;but spoKe of them all as Argentine securities, and

viewed then In the same light. It was therefore In order to
raise the external credit ot the country that the Government
Bought to regularise the position of provincial securities.
The railways were guaranteed by the State, and called for heavy
payments on the guarantees. The paper-money was Inconvertible,
and had all the drawbacKs of such a currency. For all this a re-
medy had to be found, and the Government went to worK.
The law of January 10,1895 » the agreement between the Na-
tional Government and the provinces of Rlos, oorrlentes, Santa
Pe, Buenos Aires, and Cordoba, and the laws based on these acts
resulted In the following Important measures: I )the National
Government undertook to take charge of the provincial external
debts, and to Issue Its bonds, on equal conditions as to Inte-
rest and aiQortlsatlon, In exchange for the provincial securi-
ties; 2) the Guaranteed Banks were abolished, and the Nation-
al Government took chargeo^and responsibility for, the banknotes
Issued by them. Only part of the provincial securities were
placed abroad, but, according to Mr. Jose A. Terry ( ContribuciO".
p. 31) these measures Increased the foreign Indebtedness of the
nation by more than one hundred million pesos.
It was no easy task to live up to such obligations for a
government which was Just emerging from a hard political and
economic crisis, and had large deficits in its ordinary budgets^
but it was made still harder by the fact that most of the new
obligations involved large payments abroad. I.e. payments in
gold, and to effect this, with a rate of exchange aUove hoofo
(In June 189^ only M-6k-<fo) was by no means easy ,ioihcl'- already the
preceding administration of Saenz Pena tried to meet the pay-
ments on the battleships and military supplies ordered abroad

by means of foreign loans.
This was the real origin of the project of consolidation of
the debt presented to the Houses of Congress In 1895 • Accord-
ing to this project 3«0.000.000 pesos gold were to be Issued In
bonds at 4^3 Interest and J^o araortlsfj t Ion, to be used as follows:
230.OCO.OOO for the conversion of the outstanding national debt
of 222.000.000 pesos, 35,000.000 for the payraents on railway
guarantees, and 85. 000. 000 to meet the onilgatlons In connection
with the provincial debt. This project was accepted by the Cham-
ber of Deputies, but rejected by the Senate (dose A. Terry make5
a curious mistake - for a former Minister of Finance- in say-
ing that the project was rejected by the Chamber of Deputies:
Contrlbucion, p. 32. - Dr. Avellaneda's ( Credlto Publico, t.
Ill, p. 204- ff . ) detailed statement of the parliamentary history
of the project was followed here^. The rejection of the project,
and the simultaneous growth of the military expenditure forced
the Government to have recourse to the oldest, but in a young
country certainly not the best, method of raising money - in-
creased taxation: the custom duties on Imported goods were in-
creased by a horizontal raise of 10^, and the tax on alcohol
was gradually raised from|i0.l5 to II per liter.
In general, however, the situation in 1896 was somewhat
better than in the two preceding years. There was a balance of
1^.58 mill, pesos gold in favour of the country in its foreign
trade, while gold was quoted at 2S2,Sf to 3I7fo; at the same
time the Issues of the Caja de Conversion rose to 295 '165 '957
national pesos, a sum far superior to what was really required
by the commerce of the country. During the years 1896 and 1897
the financial administration was certainly progressing in its

methods of worK. It is true that owing to heavy military expendi-
ture^ the budgets were still closed with deficits (52 mills. In
1896, and kG mills. In 1897 )» but the deficits were diminishing^
enough money was sent to London to meet the payments on the fo-
reign Indebtedness, and the credit of the country was rising —
which was considered to be a very Important fact since It faci-
litated the Inflow of foreign investments into the country and
the development of Its wonderful^ natural reF^,ources.
|
In short, the administration of Uriburu did for Argentine yifi
what the a,xlminlstrat ion of Campo salles did some time later for
Brazil; It created conditions which allov;ed plac6yjhe finan-
ces of the country on a solid basis, cleared aw&i' such obstruct-
ions as the Guaranteed QanXs and provincial indebtedness abroad,
and left to its successor, the administration of Roca, the task
of finally doing away with the consequences of the mlstaKes and
crimes of the past.
One of the first acts of the new administrstion was to regu-
late the relations created by the acceptance of tne responsibi-
lity for the railway and provincial Indebtedness by the Govern-
ment during the preceding administration. This was done only
partly, since the Government converted the provincial securities
Into its consolidated bonds, and Increased thereby tlie nation-
al Indebtedness by about i50.OOO.OOO pesos, but most of the
provinces did nothing towards paying tht*r quota of the new
burden to the National Government. Nevertheless, the new arrange-
ment raised the national credit, and thus definitely removed one
of the most unpleasant consequences of the old mlstalces dating
as far bacK as the time of the "reforms" of 1885
.
Meanwhile, as was stated above, and is shovm in the follow-

Ing table, the economic situation of the country was becoming
better and better, and the rate of exchange was rising with a
rapidity which was becoming dangerous. To understand this one
must bear in mind that a rapid rise of the rate of exchange
may be Just as detrimental to the business of a country as a
rapid fall. The relations beti/veen the cost of production and
the selling price are materially affected thereby, especially
in the export trade, and an absence of equilibrium is produced
between trades working for the local market and those working forij
export. When the depreciation or appreciation of money take
place gradually, the commercial relations of the country have
time to adjust themselves to the variation of the monetary unit
but when the price of the unit of circulation changes 25^ in
four month* (the rate of exchange was 278^ in August 1898, and
rose to 206fo in December of the same year), the change is too
rapid to allow a natural adjustment, and the producer, espe-
cially the farmer, must suffer. We have seen above, how curious-
ly the question was solved in Brazil by artificially keeping
the rate of exchange below its natural level. A more patriotic
way was found in Argentine.
At the beginning of the sessions of the congress the Presi-
dent stated that the nation must some day reestablish the spe-
cie circulation, or have recourse to b conversion, and that the
decision must not be over-hasty. He recommended therefore to
begin at once the consideration of the rate of conversion and /
its general principles.
Acting on this suggestion, the Minister of Finance, Cr.
Jose M. Rosa, presented in August 1899 to the Congress four
projects of a Law of Gonversion, one of which, after conslde-

rafele alterations, became finally the Law of 1899. According to
Mr. Avellaneda ( Credito Publico, t. Ill, p. 28^), the program
of the Government was as follows: I) to select a rate for the
future conversion, and fix the real value of the peso for the
year 1899; 2) to form a metallic fund which would guarantee and
maKe generally possible this operation; 3) to maintain the con-
version through an office in the Caja de Conversion which would
operate as an automatic regulator ,exchanging paper for gold and
vice ^ersa, at the fixed rate of h^ centavos gold for a paper
peso; k) to transact the international exchanges through the
BanK of the Argentine Nation; 5) to diminish the expenses of the
admdinistration by strict economy, to make the revenue the funda-
mental law of expenses, etc.
As to the rate of exchange of the paper peso, it was found
that the average quotation for gold during the decade 1889-
1898 was 303^, and therefore it wq.s expected that a rate of
gh
exchange in the nei^jourhood of this figure would more or less
equally protect the interests of persons having contracted loans^
bought lands, or become parties to wage and business contracts
during that period (it may be pointed out, by the way, that a
simple average quotation is a rather Inexact way of finding
the true mean value, and the application of the method of least
squares would probably give a result considerably nearer the
true marX). For the last year, howetser, i.e. August 1898 to
August 1899, it was found that the average quotation was about
239^/0, while the rate of exchange which existed when the 128.2
mills, of the internal debt were issued was only 306-;/^. Out of
all this mass of rates of exchange, some ^justified by actual

facts, others by historical considerations or the magic of sta-
tistics, a rate of M-k centavos gold per pafer peso, equivalent
to 227.?>7fo, was chosen, and the Law of 1899, No. 3871, passed.
This law is so important that we give Its provisions in detail.
The first article stated that the Nation will convert the
entire actual fiduciary issue of the banKiiotes having a legal
circulation into national gold money, at the rate of one peso in
national legal currency for forty four centavoe of a national
gold peso. I\irther the law stated that? the Executive Power will
announce the time and method of the execution of the provisions
of the previous article. The Executive Power will proceed to
form a metallic reserve, to Known as conversion Fund, destin-
ed to serve exclusively as a guarantee for the conversion of the
paper currency. This fund will be formed by: I) additional 5/5 on
the import duties; 2) the assets of the BanX of the Nation; 3)
the profits of this Banic; 4) the sums obtained by the sale of
the Andina and Toma railroads; 5) special sums assigned to this
IMnd annually by the respective budgets. These sums will be
Kept in the BanX of the Argentine Nation, and will be used by
the BanK for the draft business on foreign countries, while
the Caja de Conversion will Keep a special account of the banK-
notes issued in compliance with this law, and the gold received
injexchange for them. In no case will the gold received by the
Caja de Conversion under the provisions of this law be used for
any pthpiDse other than exchange of b&nKnotes at the rate fixed
by the law, and the members of the Caja de Conversion will be
personally responsible for any infringements of this provision.
Facts have shown since the publication of the law that the

rate of exchange of centavos, though not an Ideal one, was
at least near enough the actual conditions to cause to the
country no extra troubles. An exchange at par could not be then
adopted, and leaving the peso to the tender mercies of the money
exchange speculators would hardly help to bring nearer the time
of resuming payments In gold at par. Whether a government of a
country has theoretically a sovereign right to change the value
In gold of Its paper monetary unit is a debatable question, but
there can be scarcely any doubt as to the practical advisabili-
ty of paying cents on a dollar rather than nothing at all.
The following table may show that the country needed such a law,
was certainly on the way to prosperity, but that the general
situation was still such as to require utmost care in not over-
taxing the economic ressources of the population: exports are
In favour /jzi/ of the country, but the margin Is as yet very
small
.
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It must be distinctly undestood that the object of the law
of 1899 was not a conversion, but a preparation for a convers-
ion. In 1899 there were 286.771,690 paper pesos In circulation.
The law reduced them to 126.179.5^3 pesos gold, but It did not
convert them Into gold simply because at the time of the pro-
mulgation of the law the Gaja de Conversion did not yet possess
the necessary gold fund. The problem was now to obtain It, and
that was not easy. In 1900 the external debt was Increased by
2. 672. 000 pesos through the termination of the settlement of
the provincial debt. In I90I began again, under a previous
agreement with ^he Comlte' Rothschild, the amortisation of the
external debts, and there w-^i-e, besides. Treasury drafts for four-
teen million pesos gold to be paid. At the sarae time there were
many things which tended to maKe the situation particularly dif-
ficult: the plague In Argentine stopped the export of cattle to
Europe and Brazil; the events In South Africa practically close
the British market for South American securities, while the po-
litical complications on the Chilean frontier necessitated an
increased military expenditure, and at the sajne time created
a feeling of mistrust on the home market.
The Government again tried to have a consolidation of the
external and internal debts adopted by the Congress, and succee-
ded in the Senate, but the pressure of public opinion prevented
its pas3?ige 1 n the Chamber of Deputies: this was done notwith-
standing the fact that, as the budget Commission of the Chamber
Of Deputies had found, the floating debt at the end of 1901
reached the huge sum of 36. 917. 000 pesos gold. The Government
then broke the bounds created by the law or 1899, and turned

the additional 5^0 of custom duties^ which ought to have gone to
the gold fund of the Caja de Conversion , to the payment of the
floating debt. Happily for the country, immediately after this
the exports began to Increase, there appeared a pronounced tend-
ency towards appreciation of the paper money, and the act which
at another time might have had the gravest consequences passed
quite unnoticed. Shortly after this, however, the rumors of a
possibility of a. war with Chile became again very Insistent, an<^
it was even currently repeated that the Government decided to
maKe new Issues of paper money in order to meet the growing ex-
penses of the armed peace, expenses which hatai already reached
the huge amount of 80.000.000 peeee gold, and increased still
more when the Government ordered in Europe two new battleships,
to Keep even with a similar order of the Chilean Government. We
have seen above how Chile was straining its last ress<ource$ at
the same time to protect itself against a possible invasion of
the Argentine army, and the writer cannot help thlniclng that it
*rouU be Of considerable Interest to show, what Interests stirred eac/?
country against the other, and made both spend far more than
they could afford, in ordering battleships and war materials
from isnglish firms in Great Britain and Italy....
The Government in 1902 had to face a very serious sltuatio>^.
The caja de Conversion was practically empty: the ^. 500*000 pe-
sos gold which it had in 1900 were reduced to 28^3 Pesos, while
the saldo of the external debt was about 375-000.000 pesos gold.
Nevertneless , the Government was willing to rely on the economic
res Sources of the country to bring a remedy to the situation,
'and made the following three declarations as to Its economic
program: It intended to I) energetically resist all attempts

to maKe new issues of currency; 2) oppose all Plans tending
to a suspension of payments in connection with the service of
the public debt; 3) emancipate the country from the tutelage
of the European banKers whose Influence was very much resented
by the public opinion. To start carrying this program out in
practice was given to the adjninistration of Qulntana (190^-6).
The peace with Chile removed the constant fear of a war<is
y^eU a54 the accompanying drain on the Public Exchequer, and left the
country free to devote itself to the d- velopment of its vast
productive forces. During the year 1905 the exports reached the
amount of 527.998.265 pesos gold (this sum seems to be excess-
ive; it is given by Avellaneda, Credito Publico, Jr. Ill, Pv352;
Zegers - Estudlos Economicos, P. 135 ~ gives 205-000.000 pesos
gold as the value of the exports for the same year), the ex-
ternal debt was reduced to 329-1 mills, (at the beginning of
the year it was 370.7 mills.), and the budget was freed from
unnecessary expenses to such an extent that an unexpected sur-
plus tooK place Of the customary deficits. Still more important
was the fact that by March I906 there was a fund of over thir-
teen million pesos gold In the Ga;ja de Conversion, and that the
Qovernraent was bent upon providing an effective guarantee for
the paper circulation, and placing the funds of the Caja beyond
the possibility of beHing used for defraying ordinary expenses.
The Government proposed even to creat* a new unit of currency,
an "argentine", equivalent to centavos, or the gold value
Of a paper peso, but it was not carried into effect.
The materials available do not yet admit of a detailed
treatment of the last four years. But we find the following in-
formation in Mr. Zegers' book 'EstudiOi Economicoj ( P.I36 )
:

Paper money In circulation: in millons pesos:
1892 - I90S 286
Caja de Conversion:
Gold deposits: paper Issues:
Years : pesos or M-gd . pesos of ^M- ct
190^^... 50 115
1905... 90 205
June 125 28M-
1907..
DeceniDer. . . 102 232 ,
wnile Dr. Avellaneda states that in 1908 there were deposited
in the Oa^a de Conversion i20.OO8.OOO pesos gold, against a cir
culation of 286.771.690 peees p^^per, or each paper peso was
fully covered by centavos gold according to the law of 1899.
We shall not go into a discussion of the question of stabi-
lity as regards the Argentine currency, because, in the first ^
place, we would practically have to repeat a large part of what
said in the chapters on Brazil and Uruguay about the vast
res/lources of the country and not always sufficiently adequate
methods of government. In the second place, dit is clear from
v/hat we have said above that the dangers for the Argentine cur-
rency lurK now not in the possibility of failure of production,
or in banKlng abuses, but mainly in causes lying beyond the li-
mits of the present investigation, e.g. international complicat
Ions, internal revolutions etc.
c
^^{^j/iOQ^r*. a^^e' , in Homeric terminology, seems as yet to
be the greatest danger of the currencies of practically all
south American Republics, countries richly blessed by their
Creator, but for ages most cruelly mistreated by man.



